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FOREWORD 
The Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (IWE HAS) 
organized a workshop on November 24, 2006 entitled The Ukrainian Economy in 
Europe with the purpose of bringing together knowledge of the Ukrainian economy 
from Ukraine itself, Austria (an old EU member) and Hungary (a new EU member 
and neighbouring country to Ukraine). Researchers were invited from the Institute for 
Economy and Forecasting of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences (Valery Heyets 
and Volodymyr Sidenko), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies 
(Vasily Astrov). Mihály Simai and András Inotai from the IWE HAS took part as ses-
sion chairs, and Sándor Meisel and Zsuzsa Ludvig contributed papers. 
The presentations covered a wide spectrum of challenging and relevant Ukrainian 
economic issues, including the general macroeconomic and sociological scene, the topi-
cal issue of energy, the process of WTO accession, and FDI flows. Special attention 
was paid to EU–Ukrainian relations, including up-to-date information on the EU–
Ukraine ENP Action Plan and such challenging questions as the prospects of Ukrainian 
EU membership and the feasibility of parallel integration processes with the East (within 
the CIS area) and the West (within the EU). 
Our choices of subject were approved by the rather wide audience. Lectures were 
followed by interesting discussions involving experts, students, officials and researchers 
from various institutions. This publication covers the essence of all the presentations 
and is intended to spread the professional value of the event more widely. 
The event and the whole project were sponsored by the Austrian Science and Re-
search Liaison Office (ASO) in Budapest. 
 
 
Zsuzsa Ludvig 
project leader and organizer 
 
 
Budapest, March 10, 2007 
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I. UKRAINIAN MACROECONOMIC PROSPECTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MACROECONOMIC PROSPECTS IN THE             
LIGHT OF RECENT POLITICAL EVENTS  
Valery Heyets 
 
1) THE SOCIOECONOMIC 
SITUATION IN UKRAINE’S 
ECONOMY IN 2006, AGAINST 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
PROBLEMS OF 2005 
A dynamic rate of GDP growth of more 
than 8 per cent a year in five consecu-
tive years (2000–4) fell sharply in 2005 
to a mere 2.6 per cent, mainly due to 
tense political disputes around the presi-
dential elections in late 2004 and early 
2005. The political opposition dramati-
cally affected business confidence in fu-
ture macroeconomic stability, which in 
turn had an immediate impact on capital 
investment. The index of fixed investment 
(1990=100) rose from 122 in 1999 to 
155.7 in 2004, i.e. 33.7 points, or 6.7 
points per year. But in 2005 the in-
crease was only 1.1 points or a sixth of 
that. Contributions to the loss of confi-
dence were made by political rhetoric 
and by real moves to reprivatize assets, 
as well as higher pressure on the econ-
omy from an increase in the level of 
GDP redistribution through the consoli-
dated budget to 33.4 per cent of GDP, 
or 4 percentage points higher than in 
2004. 
The rise in the minimum wage was 
higher than in 2004 (39.2 per cent as 
opposed to 15.4 per cent). Average 
wages in the economy grew by 36.7 per 
cent. Social transfers to the population 
increased 2.2 times over. So real growth 
in monetary incomes was 18.9 per cent, 
 8 
while GDP increased by only 2.6 per 
cent. 
Many problems in the 2005 budget 
were solved not only by increased 
budget revenues relative to GDP, but by 
the resale of Ukraine’s biggest steel cor-
poration, Kryvorizhstal, and by certain 
measures to legalize export and import 
activities, which raised budget revenues 
from corresponding taxes. These factors 
meant that Ukraine’s economy in 2005 
suffered a number of serious shocks of 
the following character, of a political 
nature, and involving purchasing power, 
gasoline, sugar, meat, and revaluation of 
the currency. 
The shortage of idle capacity to ex-
pand supply led to customs tariffs being 
lowered, with immediate effects on the 
export/import ratio. Imports in 2005 
rose by 21.8 per cent, while exports fell 
by 4.8 per cent, compared with changes 
of 40 and 8 per cent in 2004. Factors 
included deterioration in commercial 
prospects, especially on metal markets, 
and trade disputes with Russia.  
For the first time in many years, 
Ukraine’s balance of trade deteriorated, 
falling to USD -1.1 billion, as compared 
with USD 3.7 billion in 2004. The rate 
of export coverage of commodity imports 
in 2005 was -3.1 per cent (12.6 per cent 
in 2004). The budget was reorienting 
towards social programmes, which re-
sulted in a reduction of the share of in-
vestment in the consolidated budget from 
15.2 per cent in 2004 to 9.7 per cent in 
2005. Rapid import growth kept inflation 
at a rather low 10.3 per cent from De-
cember to December. 
The situation was stabilized at that 
level, although the government that came 
to power after the 2004–5 presidential 
elections was forced to resign. The new 
government showed a radically different 
attitude, first of all to the institution of 
property. The policy of reprivatization 
was abandoned. Much of the proceeds 
from the sale of Kryvorizhstal remained, 
and with some increase in the budget 
pressure on GDP in 2006 (the budget 
share of GDP was expected to reach 35 
per cent) the situation was partly stabi-
lized, mainly in relation to public fi-
nance. The expected budget deficit in 
2006 was 2.6 per cent of GDP, which 
with a comparatively low debt burden 
(as of August 2006, the national debt 
Figure 1
Real GDP in 2005 and 2006, as proportions  
of same periods in the previous years, cumulative 
(%) 
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was 11.9 per cent of GDP, consisting of 
foreign debt [8.4 per cent] and domestic 
debt [3.5 per cent]) allowed macroeco-
nomic stability to be maintained despite 
the gas shock of early 2006, which had 
economic and political consequences. In 
the event, the gas price of USD 95/1000 
m3 appears to allow many activities to 
be maintained at their previous output 
level and even improve (Figure 1). 
The GDP growth rate has been 
gradually increasing since the beginning 
of 2006. According to the ten-month 
data, it exceeds 6 per cent, with nomi-
nal GDP at UHR 300.8 billion. Although 
such a GDP increase rate may be asso-
ciated with a low comparison base in 
the previous year and a rise in gross 
value added in trade and transport due 
to the increase in imports – not among 
the stable factors of economic develop-
ment – the revival extended also to the 
basic sectors of industry, above all 
manufacturing and construction. The in-
crease in gross value added in wholesal-
ing and retailing came to 13.2 per cent, 
in transport to 8.7 per cent, in electricity 
generation and distribution and gas and 
water supply to 7.4 per cent, in con-
struction to 7.1 per cent, in mining to 
6.2 per cent, and in manufacturing to 
5.2 per cent. During January-September 
2006, industrial output increased over 
the same period of the previous year by 
5.5 per cent. (Table 1) 
Assessment of the country’s political 
and economic situation based on socio-
logical surveys with common, comparable 
methodological and informational bases 
reveals both progressive and negative 
tendencies. The latter need minimizing, to 
stabilize and improve the macroeconomic 
situation. 
First the polls suggest that most peo-
ple still rate the economic situation as 
quite bad: assessments of 0–5 points still 
exceed 90 per cent of the responses. 
Most people also have a negative atti-
tude to privatization of land (52.8 per 
cent) and of big enterprises (67.2 per 
cent), so that the basis for further liberal 
reform is rather narrow, because its 
supporters have been steadily declining 
(for privatization of land from 23.8 to 
42.1 per cent, and for big-enterprise 
privatization from 17.5 to 10.6 per cent). 
Meanwhile a growing number of people 
do not wish to work for private busi-
ness, while support for socialism is over 
twice as great as support for capitalism.  
Also negative is the assessment of the 
social situation, as the number who con-
sider that organized crime plays an im-
portant role in Ukrainian life remains a 
high 33.6 per cent of respondents, al-
though the proportion has eased by 3 
percentage points over the last three 
years. 
At the same time, the chance to ex-
press political opinions freely continues to 
be rated highly: 66.2 per cent, as com-
pared with 54.9 per cent in 2004. There 
was a big increase (from 28.4 to 42.7 
per cent in 2006) in those reporting 
parties and movements in which they 
could trust: from 25.5 per cent in 2004 
to 42.9 per cent in 2006.  
However, President Yuschenko’s loss 
of support over the year has been 
considerable. In 2006, only 21.5 per cent 
respondents give him rather high assess-
ment, while in 2005 the figure was 52.0 
per cent. There are still many supporters 
of further development and consolidation 
of ties within East/Slavic Block (31.7 per 
cent), but their number has been easing 
(in 2004 the figure was 34.3 per cent). 
However, 61 per cent of Ukrainians fa-
vour accession to the EU, though 64.4 
per cent oppose joining NATO. 
Also high is the number declining to 
participate in meetings (45.8 per cent) 
and assessing the available methods of 
protecting their rights as inefficient, but 
42.3 per cent are ready to defend them-
selves against any worsening in their ma-
terial conditions. Confidence in govern-
ment bodies is rather low: only 15 per 
cent, except that the country’s president 
has a somewhat higher confidence rate 
(29.5 per cent in 2006). The mass media 
have the confidence of 31.4 per cent of 
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respondents (35.5 per cent in 2005), and 
49.5 per cent in the church.  
 
  
 
 
Table 1
Survey results of assessments of ongoing economic 
and political developments by the public 
 
A. The economy 2004 2005 2006 
1. Assessment of economic situation on a ten-point scale 
  (0– very bad, 10–very good)  
   
0–5 94,5 89,6 93,1 
6–10 5,7 10,4 6,9 
2. Attitude to privatization of land     
Rather negative 31,4 45,2 52,8 
Rather positive 42,1 27,8 23,8 
3. Attitude to privatization of big enterprises    
Rather negative 56,1 60,9 67,2 
Rather positive 17,5 13,3 10,6 
4. Attitude to privatization of small enterprises    
Rather negative 25,2 23,3 28,6 
Rather positive 47,2 43,7 43,4 
5. Would you agree to work for a private businessman     
“No” and “I would rather not” 40,4 48,5 50,0 
“Yes” and “I would rather agree” 39,7 36,4 36,8 
 
B. Politics 2004 2005 2006 
1. “I am in favour of socialism” 25.2 23,7 26,7 
2. “I am in favour of capitalism”  11.7  11,1 12,0 
3. “I support both providing there are no conflicts” 19.9 26,0 21,7 
4. What social groups play a marked role in Ukrainian society?    
Workers and peasants 40.2 47,7 47,2 
Intellectuals 13.2 18,1 18,8 
Business people and CEOs of public companies  40.8 47,4 38,8 
Political leaders 25.9 28,3 35,8 
Law and order protection bodies 22.4 23,5 24,0 
Mafia 40.2 30,7 33,9 
5. Chance to express own political opinions freely 54.9 58,4 66,2 
6. Availability of leaders able to rule the country 28.4 50,4 42,7 
7. Availability of political parties and movements,  
  to which power can be entrusted  25.5 37,4 42,5 
8. Assessment of activity on a ten-point scale    
L. Kuchma    
0–5 92.7   
6–10 7.3   
V. Yuschenko    
0–5  48,0 78,5 
6–10  52,0 21,5 
9. Assessment of political situation in Ukraine    
Quiet and prosperous 21.2 25,5 14,3 
Tense and critical 66.4 65,9 77,3 
10. What course do you prefer?    
Re-establishing ties mainly with developed Western countries 14.4 17,9 15,2 
Consolidating ties in the East/Slavic Block  34.3 29,3 31,7 
Relying mainly on own forces 17.1 20,2 20,3 
11. Attitude to Ukraine’s accession to the EU    
Rather positive 47.9 47,2 61,0 
Rather negative 11.7 19,9 24,7 
12. Attitude to Ukraine’s accession to NATO    
Rather negative 38.5 50,4 64,4 
Rather positive 18.8 14,9 12,7 
 
(cont.)
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Thus state and social institutes influ-
encing society and social life have a 
relatively low and a low confidence rate, 
respectively. The development of social 
life in this country is following its own 
rules, which is worth thinking about be-
fore we advance any further, not least 
in economic strategy, which we should in 
many aspects reconcile with the most 
influential social forces, notably the 
workers and the peasants, or convince 
them to accept. According to the assess-
ment, their level of influence amounts to 
47.2 per cent, while for the intellectuals 
it is 18.8 per cent, for businessmen and 
CEOs of public companies 39.8 per cent, 
for political leaders 35.8 per cent and 
for law and order protection bodies 24.0 
per cent. 
It is against that background that a 
new government came to power in mid-
2006, declaring as its priority an inno-
vative and investment-based course of 
economic development, coupled with re-
taining macroeconomic stability. 
2) UKRAINE’S ECONOMY IN 
2007 AND IN THE MEDIUM 
TERM 
The overall situation in Ukraine began to 
change for the better in 2006, especially 
in the second half of the year. This ten-
dency is not apparent only in statistics 
that are often difficult for the public to 
understand and interpret. It is very im-
portant for a scenario to include not 
only general economic trends, but analy-
sis based on surveys. Before describing 
the scenarios and analysing the forecasts, 
mention must be made of surveys con-
ducted by the Alexander Razumkov 
Ukrainian Centre of Economic and Politi-
cal Reform, whose data, used in this 
study, has high public prestige as an 
independent centre that adheres to liberal 
and democratic concepts.  
(cont.)
C. Social protest and public confidence 2004 2005 2006 
1. Desire to participate in protest meetings and demonstrations    
“I would rather not” 48.2 39.8 45.8 
“I would rather participate” 28.0 35.2 30.7 
2. Desire to defend own rights by way of:    
Signing petitions 21.8 24.6 22.4 
Participating in election campaigns  23.7 20.3 
Meetings and demonstrations 19.2 34.2 27.9 
None of above sufficiently efficient for me to participate 36.6 25.2 31.2 
3. Readiness for material hardships so long as law and order 
  maintained 
   
Maintaining law and order 34.2 35.2 35.1 
Protesting against worsening conditions 42.1 45.1 42.3 
4. Partial or full confidence in     
Church 44.0 52.5 49.5 
Mass media 27.9 35.5 31.4 
Tax authorities 10.5 9.9 12.3 
Police 14.2 12.3 13.5 
Public prosecutors 14.7 12.3 12.1 
Judiciary 15.6 13.2 13.7 
Pesident 15.0* 49.2 29.5 
Government 10.2 36.6 15.7 
Legislature (Verkhovna Rada) 9.1 28.5 15.2 
* L. Kuchma’s confidence rating was 33.3 per cent in 1995. 
 
 12 
According to the Centre’s data, the 
proportion of citizens who thought that 
the situation had changed for the worse 
after the first 100 days of the 
Yanukovych government was 34.7 per 
cent, as opposed to 46.2 per cent in 
December 2005. That is due to an in-
crease in the proportion of respondents 
who believed that the economic situation 
was unchanged, from 32.5 per cent in 
December 2005 to 46 per cent in No-
vember 2006, although the proportion of 
those who notice some improvement de-
clined to 11.1 per cent from 12.6 per 
cent in December 2005. While Ty-
moshenko’s government in October 2005 
received a grade of 2.54 points out of 5 
and Yekhanurov’s one of 2.51 points in 
December 2005, the Yanukovych gov-
ernment in November 2006 received 2.73 
points, even though the social assessment 
of the government was not the best of 
the three (2.63 points, as opposed to 
2.87 and 2.68 respectively). For the 
whole period, the Yanukovych govern-
ment scored 2.76 points, which was 
higher than the grades of the previous 
governments (2.68 and 2.69 points re-
spectively). However, the populist policies 
of the Tymoshenko government in April 
2005 took its grades above 3 points, 
although the advantage had been lost 
again by October 2005, as we have 
seen. 
There are grounds for saying that the 
most realistic of the scenarios of future 
development for Ukraine and its economy 
in 2007 is the optimistic one. The same 
applies to medium-term prospects. But a 
pessimistic variant has been included and 
come true if there are tensions in the 
political and social spheres, and on en-
ergy markets, one of the main risks to 
the economy. Section IV of this paper 
discusses in more detail the country’s 
energy problems and their influence on 
the economy as a whole. 
The most important medium and long-
term task of national macroeconomic 
policy is to ensure stability, openness and 
justice in financial relations between the 
state and society, so as to create a basis 
for a new social contract and dynamic 
development based on innovation, invest-
ment, and structural and technological 
modernization. The policy of accelerating 
growth in human potential by increasing 
in labour quality and simultaneously en-
couraging work efficiency has top prior-
ity among the factors for ensuring inno-
vation-based dynamic development.  
The state’s structural policy has to be 
oriented to developing the infrastructure 
and reforming enterprises, raising the 
level of control over the natural monopo-
lies, and restricting the manipulation of 
markets for corporate interests. The state 
also has to encourage export diversifica-
tion, to bring a gradual increase in the 
share of manufacturing produce, espe-
cially high-tech items. 
The government’s financial solvency 
has to be maintained mainly by reform-
ing budget-funded state institutions and 
minimizing the practice of non-return 
funding, instead of funding based on the 
results. An improved investment climate 
will reduce capital outflow and provide 
conditions for repatriating capital previ-
ously taken abroad. 
Social change should also provide 
needed social stability and reproduction 
of intellectual capital, and overcome ex-
cessive social inequality, which will help 
to lower business risks and promote 
overall development.  
The basic stages of government re-
form must be accomplished in the years 
to come, to ensure efficiency of economy 
policy-making. On the whole, we expect 
national policy in 2006–2011 to follow 
the priorities of the “The Universal of 
National Unity”: high living standards, a 
competitive, knowledge-based economy, 
just and efficient power, and a globally 
integrated and respected state. In par-
ticular, “The Universal of National Unity” 
shows that national economic policy 
should be oriented to:  
∗ Raising the wellbeing of Ukrainian 
citizens, overcoming poverty by means 
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of efficient and beneficiary-oriented 
social protection, guaranteeing decent 
work compensation, and just pension 
provisions. 
∗ Formation of a middle class through 
transformation of income policy, de-
velopment of business, and encour-
agement for creating new jobs. 
∗ A more accessible, higher -quality 
education, popularization of a healthy 
way of life, reorientation of the health 
system towards human development, 
and the creation of national centres to 
fight tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. 
∗ Introduction of the principles of inno-
vation-based scientific and technologi-
cal development, maintaining annual 
GDP growth rates at no less than 5 
per cent, and encouraging the crea-
tion of at least one million jobs a 
year. 
∗ Economic restructuring. 
∗ Tax reform that relieves the tax bur-
den by expanding the taxation base, 
including gradual introduction of re-
alty tax (wealth tax) and a single so-
cial contribution from the work com-
pensation fund. 
∗ Ensuring Ukraine’s energy security, 
higher efficiency in the use of natural 
resources and energy materials, and 
introduction of energy-saving technolo-
gies. 
∗ Raising the efficiency of agriculture 
and of state care of the peasantry; es-
tablishing no later than 1 January 
2008, a fully-fledged land market 
with a corresponding legal base (legis-
lation on the land registry, land price, 
etc.)  
∗ State guarantees and protection of 
property rights. 
∗ Increasing accessibility and quality of 
public-utility services by developing 
competition in the housing sector and 
in public utilities. 
3) FORECAST SUMMARY  
The basic scenario predicts that the 
slowdown in 2005 and early 2006 will 
be followed by higher growth rates in 
late 2006 and overall continuation of 
this tendency until 2011, through eco-
nomic restructuring, new innovative in-
vestment, growing competition on domes-
tic and foreign markets, and transforma-
tion of the mechanisms of capital and 
labour flow, which will promote greater 
efficiency in productive factors. 
3.1. External assumptions 
The new tendencies in the world eco-
nomic system will include mounting pres-
sure on international policy from the de-
veloped nations and increasingly strong 
international competition. There will pos-
sibly be further increases in the price of 
Ukraine’s imported natural gas and con-
tinuing high oil prices in 2006–8, caus-
ing Ukraine’s energy-intensive economy 
considerable loss of competitive advan-
tage. This may lead to lower exports 
and a consequent decline in the GDP 
growth rate along with an increase in 
the domestic price level. Meanwhile 
Ukraine’s negotiations towards accession 
to the WTO will continue, but there will 
be instability and probable worsening of 
world demand for its exports, which will 
restrict the economy’s growth prospects.  
3.2. Internal assumptions 
In the real sector, the dynamics of real 
GDP, inflation, and key indicators of the 
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foreign sector in Ukraine are estimated 
somewhat pessimistically, based on expec-
tations of a considerable increase in the 
price of natural gas and further in-
creases in international oil prices. The 
latter will be supported on the demand 
side by retention of  extremely high de-
velopment rates in such vast economies 
as China and India, and on supply side, 
by uncertainty about the political situa-
tion around Iran, overall aggravation of 
politico-ideological antagonism with the 
Muslim world, and anti-American (anti-
Western in a broader context) policy 
conducted by Venezuela. In this context, 
there can be expected a marked rise in 
production costs, causing a relative de-
cline of price competitiveness in Ukrai-
ne’s energy-intensive products, which are 
still the core of its export potential. That 
will obviously encourage massive intro-
duction of new energy-saving technolo-
gies, as well as some structural adjust-
ment of Ukrainian industry towards ac-
celerated development of its non-energy 
intensive components. Both directions will 
require considerable expansion of invest-
ment and imports of investment goods. 
These tendencies coupled with slow ex-
port increases (due to some loss of price 
competitiveness) will cause a considerable 
increase in the trade deficit and so the 
deficit on the current account. 
According to pessimistic estimates, in-
flation may reach 15 per cent by late 
2007, due to expectations of increased 
production costs in the current year 
(due to higher energy prices in 2006–7 
and higher wage expenditure), introduc-
tion of strict limits on gas consumption, 
a rise in rail and public-utility tariffs, 
and development of a corresponding 
multiplier effect, if the waves of price 
increases are prolonged.  
In monetary policy, the NBU will fol-
low a reserved and flexible course to 
balance money supply and demand and 
ensure stability of the hryvnia: 
∗ The money supply will grow at a 
slower rate (due to slower increases 
in household incomes and to the 
NBU’s measures to curb inflation). 
∗ There will be a lower rate of increase 
in household savings (due to lower 
rates of increase in incomes and con-
tinued high rates of consumption). 
∗ There will be lower interest rates on 
credits (as a result of lower inflation 
rates and revival of competition be-
tween the commercial banks). 
∗ The NBU will maintain a stable 
hryvnia exchange rate with insignifi-
cant devaluation and increased fluc-
tuation due to NBU measures to curb 
inflation. 
In fiscal policy in 2007 (based on the 
draft Act on the State Budget of Ukraine 
for 2007), there is no prediction of fis-
cal pressure on the real sector (although 
the state budget will adopted with a 
package with fiscal amendments), but 
tax collection will be become stricter. 
The rules on VAT returns established 
since 2005, if they remain in the fore-
casting period, will create conditions for 
further increases in receivables and pay-
ables, and induce reduction of circulat-
ing assets of economic agents. Repay-
ments of foreign and domestic debt (de-
spite a recent reduction) may cause cuts 
in budgetary expenditures on economic 
development (due to a fall in the invest-
ment budget), which may have a detri-
mental impact on corporate profits in 
2007 and later years (through under-
funding and growth of domestic debt 
associated with under-investment in inno-
vation, economic development and quali-
tative restructuring.)  
Turning to social policy, the increase 
rates in disposable incomes and average 
monthly wages will be no lower than in 
July–August 2006. Most of the increase 
in nominal and real average monthly 
wages is likely to come through a rise in 
the minimum wage, and secondarily, 
from adjustment of the single-tariff 
schedule for some worker categories in 
the budget-funded sector. A rise in the 
nominal average monthly wage of 32.3 
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per cent (37.2 per cent in the budget-
funded sector) was expected in 2006, 
along with a real wage increase of at 
21.9. According to the draft state budget 
for 2007, the minimum wage was to be 
at 76.2–82.1 per cent of subsistence 
level. With these assumptions, a consid-
erable shortfall in the rates of increase 
in real average wages and in disposable 
incomes was expected in 2007, as com-
pared with previous forecasts, which 
posed a threat to further stable eco-
nomic development. The increase in real 
average monthly wages in the corporate 
and budget-funded sectors would be 
lower than in 2006, so that the increase 
in nominal wages would exceed that in 
the consumer price index, but not that 
of nominal GDP, while approaching the 
growth rate of disposable incomes. In-
creases in disposable incomes and aver-
age monthly wages in 2008–11 will 
gradually converge on that of real GDP, 
with insignificant deviations, as a sign of 
a stable economic development and a 
promise of reduced income differentiation 
among the employed and the population 
as a whole. 
The basic scenario assumes overall 
preservation of the current investment-
oriented development model, based 
mainly on companies’ own funds. There 
will be a revival of investment demand 
starting in 2006–8, at the expense of 
borrowed funds (Table 2). Under such 
conditions, the growth rates of gross in-
vestments are forecasted at a high level, 
(9,3–11.1 per cent as annual average). 
Assessing the impact of these factors 
yielded a forecast GDP growth in 2006 
of 5.8–6.5 per cent and in 2007 of 5.0–
5.8 per cent. But such figures are too 
low for a country that lost half its GDP 
during the years of the transformation 
crisis. Considering the positive changes in 
Ukraine’s economy over the last four 
years, the relatively favourable business 
climate on foreign markets, and a con-
siderably improved situation in export-
oriented sectors, this country’s real GDP 
in 2008–11 is expected to grown by an 
annual average of 6.9 per cent. High 
GDP growth will be supported by higher 
growth rates in domestic and external 
demand. 
The forecast for the period is slower 
price growth together with a consider-
able inflation rate caused by an increase 
in available incomes of households (de-
mand-pushed inflation) and inflationary 
expectations by producers, due to higher 
government social payments.  
It is projected that moderate activities 
of the government on the market for 
external borrowing will bring concentra-
tion of credit activities in the private sec-
tor and reflect in lower average 
weighted interest rate on credits.  
4) POLICY ISSUES AND      
UNCERTAINTIES 
The forecast risks in policy on the devel-
opment of the real sector are these: 
∗ Retention of high costs in the produc-
tion will have a negative impact on 
company profitability and reduce in-
centives for business activity, through 
higher tariffs from natural monopolies 
(electricity, communications, transports, 
utilities) and costs in related activities, 
and higher inflation pushed by pro-
duction costs, due to rises in company 
spending on energy and materials 
(higher prices), wages and other fac-
tors.  
∗ A sharp speculative increase in hous-
ing prices could lead to collapse in 
the realty market. 
∗ A rise in consumer prices due to the 
inability of government and business 
to balance commodity and financial 
flows. 
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∗ Absence of a well-defined state strat-
egy for energy provision, low effi-
ciency of national purpose-oriented 
programmes in the real sector, and 
lack of efficient mechanisms and 
methods for realizing budget-funded 
programs and for control over their 
implementation all create a danger 
Table 2 
A forecast of the main macro indicators of the economy in 2006–2011 
 
Macro indicators 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Change in real macro indicators:          
GDP, % 9.6 12.1 2.6 6.2 5.8 6.5 7.1 7.5 6.5 
Final consumption expenditure, % 12.8 13.0 13.2 7.1 6.9 6.8 7.8 5.4 5.1 
• Government consumption, % 14.8 4.7 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.6 3.2 2.7 2.1 
• Private consumption, % 12.4 16.3 16.6 8.5 8.2 8.1 9.2 6.5 5.9 
Gross fixed investment, % 15.8 10.2 -0.3 6.8 8.0 8.9 10.2 12.2 11.1 
Exports, % 10.3 18.1 -11.2 5.6 3.8 5.6 7.2 7.4 6.5 
Imports, % 16.4 13.6 2.1 11.8 4.5 6.2 6.8 5.5 5.7 
Prices and exchange rate:          
Consumer price index, year-on av-
erage, % 5.2 9.1 13.5 8.5 10.5 9.3 8.5 6.8 5.5 
December to December, % 8.2 12.3 10.3 10.5 - - - - - 
Producer price index, year-on aver-
age, % 7.8 20.4 16.8 9.7 8.9 11.6 10.2 8.2 6.8 
December to December, % 11.1 24.1 9.5 16.2 - - - - - 
Exchange rate, average for period, 
UHR/USD 5.33 5.31 5.14 5.05 5.1 5.2 5.23 5.27 5.3 
Money and credit:          
NBU discount rate, % 7.0 9.0 9.3 8.7 8.5 8.2 8.0 7.5 7.0 
Credit interest rate, % 18.0 17.8 16.0 15.5 15.0 14.5 14.0 13.5 13.0 
Deposit interest rate, % 6.5 6.3 6.5 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 
Monetary base, % 30.1 34.2 54.2 30.5 29.5 26.0 24.0 22.0 21.0 
Money supply (M3), % 46.5 32.1 54.3 36.2 34.5 30.5 28.0 26.0 25.0 
Budget:          
Total revenues, % to GDP 28.2 26.5 31.6 32.5 31.2 29.4 28.6 28.0 27.5 
Total expenditures, % of GDP 28.4 29.4 33.4 34.5 33.3 31.4 30.3 29.5 28.3 
Balance, % to GDP -0.2 -2.9 -1.8 -2.0 -2.1 -2.0 -1.7 -1.5 -0.8 
Social indicators:          
Real average monthly wages, % 15.2 23.8 20.3 18.8 9.5 10.0 10.2 10.8 11.2 
Real unemployment rate, % 9.3 9.2 8.9 8.5 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.5 
Foreign trade           
Exports of goods and services, USD 
billion 28.95 41.29 44.38 48.90 50.81 54.11 58.82 62.82 66.28
Imports of goods and services, USD 
billion 27.67 36.31 43.71 51.53 53.59 55.84 58.58 62.33 65.69
Foreign trade balance, USD billion  1.28 4.98 0.67 -2.63 -2.78 -1.73 0.24 0.50 0.59
Exports, USD billion: SITC 0–1 1.92 2.91 3.22 3.94 4.60 5.00 5.54 6.08 6.51
SITC 2+4 2.40 3.41 3.33 3.62 3.55 3.60 3.71 3.84 4.08
SITC 3 2.83 3.47 3.50 3.74 3.64 3.15 2.97 3.20 3.23
SITC 5–9 16.59 23.64 24.97 28.06 30.02 33.28 37.22 40.22 42.78
All goods 23.74 33.43 35.02 39.36 41.81 45.03 49.44 53.34 56.60
Imports, USD billion: SITC 0–1 2.11 2.45 2.57 2.47 2.51 2.61 2.68 2.87 3.03
SITC 2+4 1.03 2.25 1.52 1.67 1.72 1.74 1.85 1.99 2.10
SITC3 8.19 10.40 12.69 14.49 14.71 15.26 15.57 16.72 16.96
SITC 5–9 12.68 15.59 19.38 23.24 25.11 26.20 28.55 30.67 33.14
All goods 24.01 29.69 36.16 41.87 44.05 45.81 48.65 52.25 55.23
Trade balance, USD billion  -0.27 3.74 -1.14 -2.51 -2.24 -0.78 0.79 1.09 1.37
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that the budget funds allocated for in-
troducing energy-saving technologies 
will not be fully used (e.g. some may 
be spent on public utilities due to 
their critical condition) or used effi-
ciently. 
∗ Absence of radical measures for im-
proving trade relations with the main 
trade partner, Russia, may lead to 
further reduction in import quotas on 
the Russian market, increase the 
number of anti-dumping investigations 
of Ukrainian exports, reduce those 
exports, bring higher prices for im-
ported energy materials and corre-
sponding increases in electricity 
charges, and cause greater resource 
intensity in companies. These will 
worsen company financial indicators, 
causing further decline in investment 
and lower budget revenues. 
The forecast risks in monetary policy 
are these: 
∗ Uncontrolled increases in foreign bor-
rowing (medium and long-term non-
guaranteed credits) may lead to 
higher demand for foreign currency 
from economic agents with limited 
scope for earning it, which will place 
additional pressure on the domestic 
market. That will also promote “im-
ports” of external factors related to 
instability on international exchange 
and financial markets, with a negative 
impact on the domestic exchange 
market.  
∗ Worsening of the trade balance with 
a limited inflow of foreign exchange 
within the country’s balance of pay-
ments (due to deterioration in the in-
vestment climate) may create consider-
able pressure to devalue the national 
currency. 
∗ Deterioration in company financial in-
dicators (due to the marked increase 
in the natural gas price and continu-
ing “trade wars” with Russia) may 
reduce bank deposits by companies’ 
and organizations. 
∗ The public finance situation may be 
worsened by government subsidies for 
consumers of natural gas, to cover 
the price difference. 
∗ Government may prove unable to ap-
ply market mechanisms of price regu-
lation. 
∗ Corporate debt may increase. 
∗ Deterioration of macroeconomic rela-
tions through big volumes of con-
sumer credit from banks, notably in-
creases in the foreign trade deficit (as 
imported durables are bought on 
credit) and a gap between the rise in 
household real incomes and bank 
credit, which could jeopardize banking 
stability. 
The forecast risks for budget policy 
are these: 
∗ There may be populist decisions on 
additional benefits that increase social 
or other expenditures without regard 
for budget constraints, and insufficient 
financing of government investment in 
innovation, economic development and 
qualitative restructuring in the econ-
omy (as a result of limited budget 
funds).  
∗ A higher share of the state sector in 
domestic credit (mainly to finance the 
deficit on the state budget) may re-
duce credit supply to the real sector, 
which, in turn, may damage the cir-
culating assets of companies and or-
ganizations and reduce their invest-
ment and profit-making capabilities. 
The forecast risks concerning social 
policy are these: 
∗ There are major risks expected to the 
balance of commodity and financial 
flows on the consumer market in 
2007, against a background of low 
increases in real average monthly 
wages and disposable incomes, due to 
a considerable gap between the mini-
mum wage and subsistence level, cou-
pled with failure to carry out the 
second and third stages in introducing 
the single tariff schedule.  
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∗ Subsistence level in 2007, after ad-
justment for the increase in consumer 
prices, will reach UHR 550–600, so 
that the minimum wage should equal 
that. The risk may be offset either by 
accumulating resources to raise the 
minimum wage to UHR 500 and 
bring it closer to subsistence level, or 
by improving in justice terms the sys-
tem of social protection of low-income 
citizens through housing and public 
utility subsidies.  
∗ The further decline in economic 
growth is expected to slow increases 
in real average monthly wages and 
disposable incomes, which may reduce 
the potential for endogenous economic 
growth, causing lower effective de-
mand and consumption and saving 
propensities.  
The forecast risks for trade policy are 
these: 
∗ Protracted deterioration in the balance 
of the foreign economy will oblige the 
NBU to abandon its current policy of 
maintaining a stable nominal exchange 
rate for the hryvnia and shift to mod-
erate devaluation, to support a stable 
real effective exchange rate. The nega-
tive factors in the external sector will 
peak in 2007–8, and 2009 will initi-
ate some improvement in the external 
economic balance, if the structural 
corrections are successful. 
∗ Ensuring a stable long-term rate of 
economic development means resolving 
some fundamental problems: acceler-
ated investment of the real sector 
through government measures to in-
troduce efficient mechanisms for the 
use of household funds, privatization 
revenues, and domestic and foreign 
direct investment; government imple-
mentation of efficient institutional re-
forms of property institutions, creation 
of market infrastructure, development 
of the cooperative movement, in-
creased efficiency of production and 
exchange, and a programme of en-
ergy saving; strict budget policy, 
through tighter budget discipline, bet-
ter control over expenditures, and re-
duction of tax exemptions – with si-
multaneous easing of the tax burden 
for producers, and introduction of a 
competition-based system of state pro-
curement; and use of efficient mone-
tary instruments to stabilize monetary 
and macroeconomic indicators. 
5) ENERGY PROBLEMS, IN-
VESTMENT PROSPECTS, AND 
EFFICIENCY OF SOCIOECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The most urgent problem for Ukraine’s 
economy is to ensure rapid growth of 
fixed investment, as the available fixed 
capital is ageing, technological renewal is 
weak, and without annual economic 
growth exceeding 6 per cent, the prob-
lems in public consumption will worsen 
further. 
At the same time, the additional fi-
nancial load that companies may face 
from higher prices for imported natural 
gas could seriously undermine their in-
vestment potential, and as their own re-
sources are the main source of invest-
ment funds (over 61 per cent), this poses 
another serious risk for the country’s 
economic prospects. Such tendencies are 
apparent in some data provided by the 
Ministry of the Economy: 
the number of profit-making companies 
fell somewhat between February 2005 
and January 2006: 
∗ from 58.5 to 53.9 per cent in me-
chanical engineering and in metal-
lurgy, 
∗ and from 63.8 to 61.7 per cent in 
chemicals and petrochemicals. 
The falls were still not drastic, al-
though the gas price was 52.8 per cent 
higher than it had been in September 
2000. 
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Expert calculations show that an end 
price of 1000 m3 of natural gas at USD 
135.50, would provide minimum profit-
ability for Naftogaz Ukrainy and leave 
many producers making losses (Ekspert 
3/2006, 13). 
A considerable reduction of gas con-
sumption may be attained by about 
2015–20, depending on how well the 
situation develops. (See the Institute for 
Economics and Forecasting of the Ukrain-
ian National Academy of Sciences calcu-
lations, Table 3). 
The Economic Strategy of Ukraine cal-
culated and approved by the government 
assumes that imports of energy materials 
will fall by between 54.8 and 11.7 per 
cent (including gas, oil and uranium). 
Domestic gas extraction will fall from 23 
to 28 m3 billion, and extraction abroad 
to 11.6 m3 billion. There will be some 
switching to nuclear energy and coal. 
Gas consumption will fall by 36 per cent 
to 49.5 m3 billion, and the share of 
natural gas in energy imports from 32.3 
to 3.6 per cent by 2030. 
The Institute for Economics and Fore-
casting of the Ukrainian National Acad-
emy of Sciences has made projections of 
gas-price rises and assessment of their 
impact on corporate results (O. 
Bolkhovitinova). Our analysis and forecast 
calculations presented below are based 
on government statistics, and so in our 
opinion more reliable.  
Table 3 shows that most productions 
are quite sensitive to change in their 
spending on natural gas, not only in 
manufacturing, but in mining (where 
natural gas accounts for 21.5 per cent 
of total energy costs), light industry (56 
per cent), wood working and pulp and 
paper (40.7 per cent and 67.5 per cent 
respectively), mechanical engineering 
Table 3
The energy-cost pattern of companies by main energy materials, % of total energy costs 
 
Costs by individual energy carriers 
 Total 
Coal Oil Natural gas 
Coke 
and 
deriva-
tives 
Motor 
fuel 
Diesel 
fuel 
National economy total 100.0 16.5 19.1 24.8 20.1 4.2 9.4 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 100.0 0.4  3.8  22.8 68.5 
Industry 100.0 18.7 22.2 26.4 23.3 1.5 2.6 
Mining 100.0 15.0 5.4 21.5 3.6 8.3 38.2 
Manufacturing 100.0 29.9 25.8 23.1 27.1 1.1 1.8 
Food industry, processing of agricultural 
produce 100.0 2.4  48.4 0.6 21.8 18.4 
Light industry 100.0 2.3 0.0 56.0  21.7 16.3 
Lumber & wood 100.0 0.3  40.7  10.8 18.6 
Pulp & paper, publishing 100.0 0.1  67.5  1.9 2.4 
Coke & oil processing 100.0 29.9 61.7 0.5  0.1 0.1 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 100.0 0.4  91.7 1.3 1.6 2.1 
Metallurgy & metal working 100.0 5.8  30.4 58.2 0.3 1.3 
Mechanical engineering 100.0 1.9  58.8 3.0 5.6 8.7 
Energy generation & distribution, 
gas & water supplies 
100.0 43.5  50.6   0.2 
Construction 100.0 0.6 0.2 2.8  22.4 50.6 
Trade 100.0 1.7  7.9 0.1 41.8 41.7 
Accommodation & catering 100.0 3.5  24.3  48.0 16.8 
Transport 100.0 1.3  27.4  10.6 51.2 
* Calculated on the basis of statistical form 4–МТП (annual) “Report on residuals and use of energy ma-
terials and oil processing products”. 
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(58.8 per cent) and some services. How-
ever, the real scale of the effect can 
only be found by comparing such ex-
penditure with total costs of energy ma-
terials, and estimating the corresponding 
increase in operational costs. 
By our calculations, an increase in the 
gas price of the amount shown in Table 
4 would symmetrically raise total costs 
of energy materials in proportion, as 
shown. The biggest (almost synchronous) 
impact of gas price changes on energy 
costs is predicted for chemicals and for 
electricity, gas and water supplies, where 
the share of expenditure on natural gas 
exceeds 90 per cent of all energy ex-
penditure. Then come construction mate-
rials, and in order of diminishing influ-
ence, non-ferrous metallurgy, mechanical 
engineering, pulp and paper, ferrous 
metallurgy, light industry, food process-
ing, and wood working. The greatest 
impact outside industry is on accommo-
dation and catering and on transport, 
especially land transport.  
The increase in energy expenditure 
due to a higher average price for natu-
ral gas will produce the increases in op-
erational costs shown in Table 5. Here 
the risks are presented in a different 
way than with the potential growth of 
energy spending alone. The biggest influ-
ence is characteristically on chemicals, 
construction materials, and pulp and pa-
per industry.  
The positive variant assumes a 5 per 
cent rise in sales since 2004 and takes 
into account exclusively the gas-related 
factor in the rise in operational costs, 
with other operating costs fixed at 2004 
level. The profitability of most sectors 
then improves and profitability problems 
occur only in chemicals, metallurgy, con-
struction materials, and pulp and paper, 
but in view of the high basic profitability 
of these industries, such problems seem 
quite solvable: industries will become 
loss-makers only against a 200 per cent 
annual increase in the gas price, which 
is hardly probable. If the positive fore-
Table 4
Share of natural gas in total energy costs; potential increases in costs 
of energy materials depending on rise in average price for natural gas* 
(%) 
 
Potential increase, as % of 2004 base 
level, in total costs of energy materials 
with a rise of average price for 1 m3 of 
natural gas of: 
 Natural 
gas as % 
of total 
energy 
costs 75% 100% 150% 200% 
National economy total 24.8 118.6 124.8 137.3 149.7 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 3.8 102.8 103.8 105.6 107.5 
Industry 26.4 119.8 126.4 139.6 152.8 
Mining 21.5 116.2 121.5 132.3 143.1 
Manufacturing 23.1 117.4 123.1 134.7 146.3 
Food industry, processing of agricultural produce 48.4 136.3 148.4 172.6 196.8 
Light industry 56.0 142.0 156.0 184.0 212.0 
Lumber & wood 40.7 130.5 140.7 161.1 181.4 
Pulp & paper, publishing 67.5 150.6 167.5 201.3 235.0 
Coke & oil processing 91.7 168.8 191.7 237.6 283.4 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 30.4 122.8 130.4 145.6 160.8 
Metallurgy & metal working 58.8 144.1 158.8 188.2 217.6 
Mechanical engineering 50.6 138.0 150.6 175.9 201.2 
Energy generation & distribution,                 
gas & water supplies 2.8 102.1 102.8 104.1 105.5 
Construction 7.9 105.9 107.9 111.9 115.8 
Trade 24.3 118.2 124.3 136.4 148.6 
Accommodation & catering 27.4 120.6 127.4 141.1 154.8 
* Calculated as Table 3. 
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cast comes true, inflation can easily be 
kept within single digits. There will be 
no general decrease in the volume of 
own investment resources. For companies 
that try rapidly to overcome their energy 
dependence and modernize, there will be 
no additional problems with access to 
credit resources or foreign investment.  
The variant with a 100 per cent in-
crease almost corresponds to the price 
level industrial companies had in the first 
half of 2006. In the forecast context, it 
is advisable to consider the last two 
variants, with increases of 150 and 
200% since 2004, increases by 150-200 
per cent, and of operational costs in the 
economy of 2.5–3.3 per cent. In this 
case, chemicals will show a rise in oper-
ating costs of 24–32 per cent, ferrous 
metallurgy of 20–27 per cent, construc-
tion materials of 14–19 per cent, pulp 
and paper of 8–11 per cent, mechanical 
engineering of 6–9 per cent, wood 
working of 3.1–4.2 per cent, food proc-
essing of 2–2.7 per cent, and light in-
dustry of 1.1–1.4 per cent. Operational 
costs of the power sector will increase in 
this case by 11–15 per cent.  
A worse, rather more realistic variant 
of the positive forecast uses similar as-
sumptions, but a 2 per cent rise in 
sales. The general level of profitability 
then eases, but the most gas-dependent 
industries, like construction materials, 
chemicals, and metallurgy, become loss-
making. The first of these will become 
loss-making even with a prospectively 
quite realistic 100 per cent rise in the 
natural-gas price, and the rest with a 
150 per cent rise. 
The results of the realistic forecast 
differ from the previous in not stipulat-
ing any possibility of a sales increase 
without a symmetrical increase in prices 
for other operational costs apart from 
natural gas. The impact of the inflation 
factor damages the finances of almost 
Table 5
Share of natural gas spending in total operating costs; potential increases 
in operating costs depending on rise in average price for natural gas* 
(%) 
 
Energy materials 
as % of total 
operating costs 
Potential increase, as % of 2004 
base level, in total operating costs 
with a rise of average price for  
1 m3 of natural gas of:  
Total Incl. nat’l gas 75% 100% 150% 200% 
National economy total 6.7 1.7 101.2 101.7 102.5 103.3 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 18.0 0.7 100.5 100.7 101.0 101.4 
Industry 20.7 5.5 104.1 105.5 108.2 110.9 
Mining 6.2 1.3 101.0 101.3 102.0 102.7 
Manufacturing 23.5 5.4 104.1 105.4 108.2 110.9 
Food industry, processing of agricultural produce 2.6 1.2 100.9 101.2 101.9 102.5 
Light industry 1.3 0.7 100.5 100.7 101.1 101.4 
Lumber & wood 5.1 2.1 101.6 102.1 103.1 104.2 
Pulp & paper, publishing 8.3 5.6 104.2 105.6 108.4 111.2 
Coke & oil processing 13.2 12.1 109.1 112.1 118.1 124.1 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 37.8 11.5 108.6 111.5 117.3 123.0 
Metallurgy & metal working 3.1 1.8 101.4 101.8 102.7 103.6 
Mechanical engineering 14.7 7.4 105.6 107.4 111.2 114.9 
Energy generation & distribution,                
gas & water supplies 3.1 0.1 100.1 100.1 100.1 100.2 
Construction 0.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Trade 0.4 0.1 100.1 100.1 100.1 100.2 
Accommodation & catering 7.6 2.1 101.6 102.1 103.1 104.2 
* Calculated as Table 3. 
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every industry so much that higher sales 
prices seem inevitable. 
If the sales increase rate is lower (a 
worsened realistic forecast), the financial 
results of operations will raise the risks 
of a slowdown in Ukrainian investment 
development as a whole, in particular in 
the introduction of energy-saving tech-
nologies. 
Table 6 shows the expected increase in 
the sales prices of producers, assuming 
rising prices for natural gas and some 
other components of operating costs, as 
they try to maintain profitability at 2004 
levels. 
 
Table 6
Expected growth rate of sales prices needed to maintain 2004 profitability against forecast 
increases in the average price of natural gas of 75–200% 
(%) 
 
Expected growth rates of sales prices 
needed to maintain profitability at 
2004 level with a rise of average 
price for natural gas of: 
 
Profitabil-
ity of 
operations 
in 2004
75% 100% 150% 200% 
National economy total 4.0 110.6 111.0 111.8 112.6 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 2.0 110.2 110.4 110.7 111.1 
Industry 6.5 112.7 114.0 116.5 119.1 
Mining 1.2 110.7 111.1 111.7 112.4 
Manufacturing 7.8 112.5 113.7 116.3 118.8 
Food industry, processing of agricultural produce 1.2 110.7 111.0 111.6 112.2 
Light industry -1.8 110.7 110.8 111.2 111.6 
Lumber & wood 2.8 111.0 111.5 112.5 113.6 
Pulp & paper, publishing 6.4 112.8 114.1 116.7 119.3 
Coke & oil processing 13.0 115.5 118.2 123.4 128.7 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 13.0 115.2 117.7 122.7 127.7 
Metallurgy & metal working 4.6 110.7 111.1 112.0 112.8 
Mechanical engineering 2.9 114.4 116.2 119.8 123.4 
Energy generation & distribution, gas & water supplies 2.2 109.8 109.9 109.9 109.9 
Construction 1.4 109.9 109.9 109.9 109.9 
Trade -7.9 110.9 110.9 110.9 111.0 
Accommodation & catering 14.4 109.7 110.2 111.1 112.0 
* Calculated as Table 3. 
* * * * * 
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SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Vasily Astrov 
Ukraine’s economic growth exceeded 5 
per cent in 2000 and 2002, and 9 per 
cent in 2001 and 2003, and reached 
12.1 per cent in 2004. However, these 
dynamic increases must be viewed 
against a very low base, resulting from 
a dramatic decline during the the 1990s. 
Even in 2004, after several consecutive 
years of high growth, GDP was still at 
only 61 per cent of its 1990 level. The 
main factors behind the impressive per-
formance of the early 2000s were these: 
∗ Devaluation of the hryvnia in 1999, in 
the aftermath of the Russian financial 
crisis, opened up a competitive advan-
tage for producers, especially in food 
processing. 
∗ Rapid growth in Russia and other CIS 
countries brought, among other things, 
rising demand for Ukrainian machin-
ery and transport equipment on these 
markets. 
∗ World prices of steel were mounting 
(Figure 2) and external demand for 
metals – Ukraine’s major export 
commodity – was strong, particularly 
on Asian markets. 
∗ There was an upswing in domestic 
demand for capital goods. 
Figure 2
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The booming fixed investment reached 
its peak in 2003 and 2004, when it ex-
panded by 31 and 28 per cent, respec-
tively, financed primarily by the healthy 
profits of exporters, although access to 
bank credit generally improved as well. 
Private consumption was rising as well, 
although it was not until 2004 and es-
pecially 2005 that it became the major 
pillar of growth. On the production side, 
industry was leading the growth, while 
the performance of agriculture was 
much more volatile, due largely to the 
changing weather conditions for harvest. 
However, the economic growth in 
2005 slowed down to just 2.6 per cent, 
largely on account of weak investment 
demand and negative developments in 
foreign trade, while consumption picked 
up somewhat. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests the investment climate suffered 
massively from the policy steps under-
taken by the new ‘Orange’ authorities. In 
particular, the 2005 budget amendments 
introduced a five-year moratorium on 
granting new and enhancing existing tax 
benefits, while the tax and customs bene-
fits enjoyed by certain industries (includ-
ing the automotive, aircraft and space 
industries) and the ‘special economic 
zones’ (SEZs) and the ‘territories of pri-
ority development’ (TPDs) were scrapped 
with retroactive effect. The latter move 
was aimed at closing ‘loopholes’ for 
smuggling, but it also hurt investment 
projects already implemented. Even more 
importantly, the new authorities launched 
a reprivatization campaign, revising some 
of the most controversial privatization 
deals concluded under former President 
Kuchma. On the one hand, the campaign 
was intended to raise privatization reve-
nues to replenish the state budget, but it 
was also part of the fight by a new 
power elite against the financial and in-
dustrial groups that had benefited most 
under Kuchma. The government added 
to investors’ worries by making a series 
of contradictory statements about the 
scope and particulars of the upcoming 
reprivatization scheme. Although large-
scale reprivatization was never really im-
plemented, several privatization deals 
were annulled in the courts, including 
that of the country’s biggest steel pro-
ducer, Kryvorizhstal’, and of the Nikopol 
Ferroalloy Plant. Largely because of the 
new policy course, fixed capital invest-
ment increased in 2005 by a mere 1.9 
per cent, and construction output de-
clined by 6.6 per cent. 
At the same time, negative trade de-
velopments could be seen on the export 
and import sides, only partly generated 
by domestic factors. On the export side, 
world steel prices plunged by some 30 
per cent in the first half of 2005 alone 
(Figure 2), following an increase in 
China’s steel-production capacity. 
Ukraine’s steel exports, making up some 
30 per cent of its total exports, suffered 
accordingly. Simultaneously, imports were 
fostered by increased social spending and 
a currency revaluation undertaken in 
April 2005. The resulting reversal of the 
country’s trade balance was dramatic: 
the 2004 trade surplus in goods, which 
had reached €3 billion, turned into a 
€900 million deficit in 2005 (correspond-
ing to 1.4 per cent of GDP). 
That economic slowdown in 2005 and 
the early months of 2006 has recently 
been reversed again. For 2006 as a 
whole, real GDP growth of some 6.5 per 
cent is expected, driven primarily by 
services such as the retail and wholesale 
trade, but also by construction, benefit-
ing from recovering investment. Since 
May 2006, industrial output has been 
generally picking up as well, largely 
through strong expansion of metal pro-
duction, taking advantage of soaring 
steel prices and notwithstanding the “gas 
price shock”. The recovery in metals has 
already translated into the rising exports. 
Finally, private consumption gained mo-
mentum again, backed by impressive 
growth of household incomes and ex-
panding bank lending. 
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INFLATION AND THE        
EXCHANGE RATE 
The unpleasant side of fast economic re-
covery in 2000–4 was rising inflation. 
After reaching a low of 0.8 per cent on 
annual average in 2002, consumer price 
inflation in subsequent years generally 
rose, to as much as 13.5 per cent in 
2005. Industrial producer price inflation 
also speeded up and has almost invaria-
bly been higher than consumer price in-
flation (Figure 3). The 2005 slump in 
economic activity resulted in declining 
inflation, but the current pick-up in 
metal prices is translating into accelerat-
ing producer prices and will make disin-
flation of consumer prices more difficult. 
Among the important factors behind 
the demand-pull inflation were: 
∗ the persistent current account sur-
pluses the country was running be-
tween 1999 and 2005, and resulting 
inflows of foreign exchange, and 
∗ the fiscal stimulus that took effect on 
the eve of the ‘Orange revolution’ 
(largely via the doubling of pensions) 
and has been in place ever since. 
Most importantly, inflation in Ukraine 
was fuelled by relatively lax monetary 
policy. Given the country’s economic 
openness and the virtual lack of domes-
tic monetary instruments, the latter es-
sentially boiled down to exchange-rate 
policy, in particular maintenance of a de 
facto exchange-rate peg to the US dollar 
at a level of UAH 5.33 since 2002. This 
policy implied a generally constant real-
exchange rate for the hryvnia against 
the currencies of its main trading part-
ners, Russia and the Euro Zone, due to 
higher inflation in the former and 
strengthening of the Euro against the US 
dollar in nominal terms in 2003–4 (Fig-
ure 4). This helped to ensure the com-
petitiveness of Ukrainian products in for-
eign and domestic markets and maintain 
a positive trade balance and ultimately 
sound economic growth, albeit accompa-
nied by stubborn inflationary pressure. 
During the boom of 2004, there was 
evidence that some industries were oper-
ating on the verge of capacity, so that 
the high aggregate demand increasingly 
translated into higher inflation rather 
than higher production volumes – a sign 
of “overheating”. In addition, the impres-
sive increase in the price of oil, particu-
Figure 3
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larly from 2003, contributed to cost-
push inflation as well, especially as 
Ukraine’s economy is very highly energy 
intensive and energy-import dependent. 
(The price hike of imported natural gas 
at the beginning of 2006 has had a 
similar, albeit smaller effect than initially 
feared. The latter was not least due to 
the inability of some energy-intensive ex-
port branches facing international compe-
tition – such as chemicals – to shift the 
increased cost of inputs onto final con-
sumers, and resulted in declining pro-
duction volumes, at least initially.) 
In an effort to combat inflation, the 
National Bank of Ukraine abandoned the 
previous peg in April 2005 and revalued 
the currency by 4.7 per cent to UAH 
5.05/USD. This has been maintained 
since. The measure was intended to ease 
the inflationary pressure by depressing 
the cost of imports (especially energy), 
while reducing the current-account sur-
plus and the resulting inflow of foreign 
exchange. In another move, the National 
Bank scrapped the 50 per cent surren-
der requirement for export earnings, 
which had been in place since the 1998 
financial crisis. Although it can be ar-
gued that without the revaluation, the 
inflation in 2005 would have turned out 
even higher than it actually did, the 
measure hurt the real economy by re-
ducing the competitiveness of domestic 
goods and boosting imports, particularly 
of consumer goods. 
A breakdown of Ukraine’s FDI stock 
by economic activity reveals that the sec-
tor attracting the most registered FDI is 
wholesale and retail, followed by metals, 
food processing, and the financial sector. 
Metals feature prominently mainly be-
cause of the Kryvorizhstal’ deal men-
tioned earlier, while food processing and 
trade have been developing particularly 
fast in the past few years, taking advan-
tage of an initial low level (trade) and 
opportunities for import-substitution, pro-
vided by the hryvnia devaluation in 1999 
(food processing). Both branches have a 
relatively short pay-off period – a reflec-
tion of investors’ concern over the coun-
try’s longer-term prospects and the secu-
rity of their property rights. 
Figure 4
Nominal and real exchange rates 
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The current structure of Ukraine’s ex-
ports may not provide much room for 
long-term growth. As exemplified by the 
recent U-shaped path of economic 
performance, this makes the country 
highly vulnerable to volatile world steel 
prices. The deficiencies of current 
economic structure are not least due to 
disappointing FDI inflows (Figure 5). By 
the end of 2005, the cumulative inward 
stock of FDI per capita – arguably the 
most appropriate indicator of FDI pene-
tration – amounted to only  310, which 
is far below the levels seen in the ad-
vanced new member-states of the EU 
(such as Estonia or Poland), and even in 
Bulgaria or Russia. Ukraine has also 
lacked behind in terms of FDI stock as a 
per centage of GDP – though the gap is 
not so striking as the country’s GDP re-
mains very low. Finally, the EU–15 share 
in FDI stock, an arguably appropriate 
indicator of FDI quality in terms of 
bringing in new technologies and mana-
gerial know-how, stands at 58 per cent, 
which is largely in line with most other 
East European countries, Russia being an 
important exception. However, the share 
increased dramatically in just one year 
(2005) through a single deal: the  4 bil-
lion resale of Kryvorizhstal’ to the Ger-
man subsidiary of Mittal Steel, which 
was statistically captured as German FDI 
into Ukraine. 
Apart from the EU, another important 
investor in Ukraine is Russia, though of-
ficially it ranks only sixth, with a share 
of a mere 5 per cent. The official figure 
hardly reflects the true situation, as the 
bulk of Russian FDI in Ukraine flows via 
the offshore countries such as Cyprus, 
ranking second, and the Virgin Islands, 
ranking eighth. (in fact the FDI from 
such offshore countries also represents 
Ukrainian capital that had previously fled 
the country.) The high importance of 
Russian capital in Ukraine reflects not 
only the cultural and geographical prox-
imity, but economic dependence. Much 
Figure 5
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of the Russian investment has been 
driven by the latter’s failure to honour 
in good time its energy-related debt to 
Russia (particularly for gas), resulting in 
a series of debt-for-equity swaps. Russian 
acquisitions in Ukraine gained momentum 
in February 1998 after the two countries 
signed a ten-year Agreement on Eco-
nomic Cooperation, which enabled Rus-
sian companies to participate in 
Ukraine’s privatization. Assets acquired 
by Russian investors include refineries, 
energy-distribution companies, under-
ground storage tanks, port facilities, 
aluminium plants, dairies, banks, tele-
communications and broadcast media. 
However, the inflows of FDI into 
Ukraine in 2005 accelerated markedly – 
not only due to the Kryvorizhstal sale, 
but because of the  860 million acquisi-
tion of the country’s second biggest 
bank, Aval, by Austria’s Raiffeisenbank. 
This deal can be seen as part of a gen-
eral trend of mounting interest in the 
banking sector from foreign investors – 
including those from Russia. Among 
other banks sold to foreigners in the 
course of 2006 were Ukrsibbank (to 
BNP Paribas of France), Mriya (to 
Vneshtorgbank of Russia) and Ukrsots-
bank (to Banca Intesa of Italy). More 
generally, the country’s prospects of at-
tracting more FDI may improve after 
WTO accession – likely in 2007 – and 
subsequent formation of a free trade 
area with the EU. 
 
* * * * * 
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UKRAINE AND THE WTO 
Volodymyr R. Sidenko 
Ukraine has almost reached the end of 
its marathon negotiations for accession to 
the World Trade Organization, which 
have taken more than 13 years. 
On bilateral negotiations-related mar-
ket-access issues, Ukraine has concluded 
bilateral protocols with 48 out of the 56 
members of its Working Party. The bi-
lateral protocol with Chinese Taipei has 
been initialled, but negotiations with the 
Kyrgyz Republic are not yet completed 
because of incremental demands on the 
Kyrgyz side. 
Tariff reductions since 1996 have 
brought Ukraine close to the binding 
tariff system (Table 7), although pro-
gress has been inconsistent, with 
some with substantial reversals. How-
ever, for some tariffs (on meat, fish 
and foodstuffs), Ukraine is to gain 
transition periods up to 2010.  
Furthermore, Ukraine is committed 
to joining 16 WTO sectoral plurilat-
eral agreements and initiatives, on 
chemical harmonization (envisaged 
import tariffs of 5.5–6.5 per cent), 
textile and clothing (0–17.5 per cent), 
steel, toys, wood, non-ferrous metals, 
pharmaceuticals, paper, agriculture 
equipment, furniture, Information 
Technology Agreement, scientific in-
struments, construction equipment, 
medical equipment, civil aircraft, and 
distilled drinks (all with a zero tar-
iff).  
Ukrainian expert views differ on these 
initiatives. No damage is expected from 
free imports of scientific and medical 
instruments or IT products, as most of 
these high-technology items are not pro-
duced in Ukraine, or produced at an 
inadequate technological level. Free im-
ports of them will stimulate technological 
advance. The textile initiative brings no 
radical new liberalization, as Ukraine is 
already working under an EU textile 
agreement based on these terms. With 
most other sectoral initiatives, the 
Ukrainian government asserts that they 
relate mainly to inputs and raw materi-
Table 7 
Changes in Ukraine’s import tariffs and expected tariffs 
after accession 
(%) 
  
Actual tariff rate on 
Import tariff rate March 1, 
2005 
Sept. 1, 
2005 
Expected bound 
tariffs after 
WTO accession
Simple average  
Total of commodity 
nomenclature 10.47 6.51 6.28 
Industrial goods  8.29 4.40 4.85 
Agricultural products 19.71 13.84 11.16 
Weighted average 
Total of commodity 
nomenclature 7.77 7.02 5.09 
Industrial goods  6.70 6.11 4.77 
Agricultural products 21.10 18.19 10.07 
Source: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2006): Information 
and Analytical Papers on Ukraine’s Accession to the WTO. 
Prepared for parliamentary hearings on “The Current State of 
Preparation for Ukraine’s Accession to the WTO. Problems 
and Prospects”. Kiev, November 1, 2006, p. 25. 
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als, and could stimulate Ukrainian pro-
duction and involvement into interna-
tional production-cooperation chains. One 
of the most disputed is the civil aviation 
agreement, where Ukraine has actually 
employed a zero tariff since 1994, but 
this is a questionable solution for the 
development prospects of Ukrainian air-
craft facilities.  
In the services sector, Ukraine is to 
adopt specific commitments in around 
150 sectors (out of 155) – an extremely 
high proportion compared with most 
WTO members, most of which have no 
more than 100 sectors covered by WTO 
commitments.  
Ukraine passed 18 pieces of legislation 
between 2005 and October 2006 to fur-
ther harmonization of its legal system 
with WTO norms. They include the fol-
lowing:  
∗ Basic trade procedures harmonization: 
amendments to the Customs Code of 
Ukraine, and to national procedures 
related to anti-dumping and safeguard 
measures according to WTO agree-
ments.  
∗ Intellectual property protection in con-
formity with the TRIPS Agreement. 
∗ Suspension of some distorting taxation 
schemes, i.e. with regard to the spe-
cial VAT regime for agriculture. 
∗ Harmonization of the technical regula-
tion mechanism, i.e. bringing certain 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
into conformity with regulations under 
relevant WTO agreements; new norms 
relating to standards, technical regula-
tions and conformity assessment pro-
cedures; standards relating to quality 
and security of foodstuffs and food 
raw materials; consumer protection is-
sues. 
∗ Liberalization of the goods market: 
reduction of import tariffs on agricul-
tural products (Groups 1–24 of the 
trade nomenclature based on the HS); 
cuts in export duties on exported oil-
seeds (aimed at bringing them down 
from 16 to 10 per cent over a six-
year period); liberalization of motor-
car imports; withdrawal of local con-
tent requirements in motor-car pro-
duction. 
∗ Liberalization of the services market: 
activity of foreign insurance-company 
branches in Ukraine (allowed after a 
5-year transition period from WTO 
accession); auditing activities; foreign 
investments in TV and broadcasting 
activities. 
To finalize this harmonization process, 
the president and government of Ukraine 
submitted to Parliament a set of 21 pri-
ority bills to be passed within November 
2006.1 These included the following: 
∗ On systemic and sectoral trade issues: 
preparation of a substantially amended 
version of the act on external eco-
nomic activities; bringing licence pay-
ments for alcohol production and 
trade up to the real cost of licensing 
procedures for alcohol beverages and 
tobacco products; substitution of a 
current ban on exporting waste and 
scrap of non-ferrous metals and 
doped ferrous metals with export du-
ties on them; gradual reduction of 
export duties on scrap of ferrous and 
non-ferrous metals and semi-
manufactures of non-ferrous metals 
(from a current €30 per ton to €25 
from the moment of accession and to 
€10 over a six-year transition period); 
gradual reduction of export duties on 
live animals and raw skins (from 50 
and 30 per cent immediately after ac-
cession to 10 and 20 per cent, re-
spectively after eight and ten-year 
transition periods respectively); repeal 
of the prohibition on importing old 
motor-cars (over eight years old). 
∗ On the agriculture and food sector: 
abrogation of preferential VAT rates 
for home producers (9 per cent for 
agriculture and for forestry); bringing 
state support for agriculture into con-
                                                   
1 Twelve had been approved by Parliament by 
November 17, 2006, including all those covering 
intellectual property-protection issues and services. 
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formity with WTO norms; cancellation 
of export subsidies for milk and milk 
products production (though not actu-
ally used in Ukraine); bringing change 
in the quota system in production and 
marketing of sugar and revocation of 
the mandatory export of sugar made 
of imported raw material; introduction 
of a tariff quota for raw cane sugar 
imports equal to 260,000 t (with a 2 
per cent import tariff within the 
quota and 50 per cent outside it); 
harmonizing veterinary medicine regu-
lations with those set by the WTO. 
∗ On intellectual property protection: 
amending legislation on production of 
pharmaceuticals and on pesticides and 
agrochemicals (with regard to re-
stricted information protection); intro-
duction of legislative norms on the 
national regime and most-favoured-
nation treatment for geographical in-
dications of products; amending the 
Customs Code to account fully for in-
tellectual property protection in cus-
toms clearance procedures. 
∗ Amending the law on the service sec-
tor: on insurance with the view to re-
voking certain restrictions on insur-
ance activities by foreign companies 
(intermediation, re-insurance related to 
maritime carriage, commercial avia-
tion, space launching, and freight); on 
banking and banking activities with 
regard to admitting foreign bank 
branches in Ukraine, generally on a 
national-treatment regime; on the legal 
profession (admitting foreign lawyers 
to Ukrainian legal proceedings); on 
publishing (repeal over a five-year 
transition period of restrictions on 
foreign capital participation in distri-
bution services for printed materials). 
WTO accession is expected to have 
multiple effects on the Ukrainian econ-
omy. In the macro economy, the gov-
ernment expects effects on the following 
main indicators:2 
∗ Acceleration of GDP growth by 1.5–
2.0 per centage points.  
∗ A 150–200 per cent increase in FDI 
inflow within one or two years of ac-
cession.3 
∗ An annual export increment of USD 
1.43–1.57 billion,4 for instance because 
of a consolidated stand on anti-
dumping5 and special investigations, 
and circumscribed trade restrictions 
and discrimination. 
∗ Increased state budget revenues of 
about UAH 3–4 billion from suspen-
sion of tax and tariff preferences, in-
creased production volumes, and in-
tensified market turnover. So the sus-
pension of most import tariff prefer-
ences is to offset the loss caused by 
tariff reductions.6 
A study of the economic impacts of 
Ukraine’s accession to the WTO was 
made by a research consortium from 
Ukraine’s Institute for Economic Research 
and Policy Consulting, Copenhagen Eco-
nomics, and the Osteuropa-Institut 
München, based on a dynamic general 
equilibrium model (GEM).7 The principle 
ones appear in Tables 8 and 9. 
                                                   
2 Secretariat of the President of Ukraine (2006). 
Information and Analytical Papers Regarding 
Ukraine’s Accession to the WTO, Kiev, pp. 14–15. 
3 Some government forecasts suggest an annual 
FDI increment of USD 500 million. 
4 Optimistic estimates range from USD 1.5–2.0 to 
4.0 billion, or 7–10 per cent. 
5 Ukraine currently faces 24 anti-dumping inves-
tigations in 11 countries in the metallurgical sec-
tor, and 8 in 4 countries in chemicals. The over-
all value of exports subject to trade restrictions 
is around USD 1 billion. 
6 So the total reduction in import tariff revenues 
for 2007 is forecast at a low 4.70–4.49 per cent 
of total revenue, or 1.48–1.36 per cent of GDP. 
7 For a summary of results see: Secretariat of 
the President of Ukraine (2006), pp. 22–30. 
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The sectors due to gain most are 
metallurgy and chemicals, through ex-
port-led growth. The most problematic is 
agriculture, where the rate of tariff lib-
eralization is highest, and accompanied 
by a substantial cut in restricted agricul-
tural subsidies classified under the WTO 
amber-box support measures. Thus the 
current AMS level in Ukraine is esti-
mated at 12–13 per cent of total agricul-
tural production (as opposed to 5–10 
per cent permitted within the WTO).8 
                                                   
8 Ibid., p. 7. 
The final level for Ukraine is not yet 
agreed because of a dispute over the 
reference period: the Ukrainian position 
is to use 1994–6, while the other side 
demands 2000–2002 or later.9 And 
within five years of accession, the agreed 
AMS level will be cut by 20 per cent. In 
spite of the intensified competitive pres-
sure and decreased state support, the 
aggregate output is forecast by the 
                                                   
9 This would push down the AMS value for 
Ukraine from the requested USD 1.14 billion to 
slightly over USD 60 million. 
Table 8
Aggregate economic effects of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO, cumulative changes, % 
 
Changes of indicators Aggregate result of WTO accession 
Changes due to re-
forms in trade barri-
ers 
Changes due to im-
proved market access
Aggregate welfare, % 10.2 3.8 6.4 
Real GDP, % 4.8 2.0 2.7 
Consumer price index, % –2.0 –2.2 0.2 
Prices for production factors, %    
Qualified workers 5.7 3.8 1.9 
Non-qualified workers 5.7 3.5 2.1 
Capital 1.1 1.2 –0.1 
Costs of adjustment to new conditions, %   
Qualified workers 1.8 1.2 1.2 
Non-qualified workers 2.7 2.2 2.0 
Capital 0.3 4.2 0.1 
Aggregate export, % 9.2 6.4 2.6 
Aggregate import, % 11.8 7.6 4.1 
Fixed capital accumulation, % 3.7 –0.2 3.8 
Source: Burakovsky I., J. Jensen, V. Movchan, F. Pavel and L. Handrich. Macroeconomic effects of 
Ukraine’s Accession to the WTO. In: Ukrainian Centre for International Integration. The Accession to the 
World Trade Organization: New Opportunities for Ukraine, Kiev, 2006, pp. 33–7 (in Ukrainian).  
Table 9
Main long-term sectoral economic effects of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO 
 
Sector (industry) Output growth, % Export growth, % Employment change, %
Metallurgy and metal working 22.0 25.6 +19.2 
Chemical industry 20.8 26.6 +17.6 
Agriculture 1.5 43.5 –2.4 
Financial intermediation 3.9 6.3  
Telecommunications 7.8  +4.2 
Source: The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2006). Op. cit., pp. 44–52. 
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source mentioned to grow moderately, 
due to a presumed huge increase in ag-
ricultural exports. However, these expec-
tations may well be thwarted unless cur-
rent high subsidization of agriculture10 is 
eased.  
However, the results of the GEM mod-
elling mentioned in estimating the out-
comes of Ukraine’s accession to the 
WTO have to be treated with caution. 
There are economic and econometric 
methodological restrictions inherent in the 
models that reduce their reliability, espe-
cially in countries with poor institutional 
quality and weak capacity to utilize the 
preferences of the world trading system. 
11 So we are not to expect the positive 
effects to be immediate or effortless on 
the part of the government or the pri-
vate sector. But the negative effects need 
no action to pave their way. Much will 
depend on ability to restructure the 
economy and make it more competitive 
internationally in the sectors dominant in 
the contemporary global economic sys-
tem. 
To sum up, the aggregate outcome of 
Ukraine’s pending accession to the WTO 
will depend largely on its competitive 
strategy and capacity-building policy. 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                   
10 In 2004, the EU spent on such subsidies USD 
150.6 billion (1.25 per cent of GDP, of which 
only 2 per cent consists of agricultural output), 
the United States USD 108.7 billion (0.93 per 
cent, 1 per cent), and Japan USD 60.9 billion 
(1.30 per cent, 1 per cent). See Millennium De-
velopment Goals Indicators Database.  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx; World 
Bank Development Indicators 2006, Table 4.2. 
11 For WTO activities, the restrictions have been 
thoroughly analysed in Stiglitz, J. E., and A. 
Charlton (2005). Fair Trade for All: How Trade 
Can Promote Development. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
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II. PROSPECTS FOR EU–UKRAINIAN RELATIONS 
 
EU–UKRAINIAN RELATIONS WITHIN EUROPEAN                  
NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY (ENP)  
Dr. Volodymyr R. Sidenko 
Trade relations between Ukraine and the 
EU have grown fast (Figure 6). Exports 
to the EU rose over 3.3-fold in the ten 
years after 1996 and imports by a fac-
tor of 2.8. 
There are two troughs in the ascend-
ing curve, one back in 1998–9, when 
hryvnia devaluation produced a fall in 
imports from the EU, and the other in 
2005, when hryvnia appreciation coupled 
with the energy price rise, rising domes-
tic inflation, and shrinking world de-
mand for metals caused a marked fall 
in Ukrainian exports to the EU and a 
surge of EU imports. The result was a 
Figure 6
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record trade deficit of USD 2665 million. 
Aggregate trade in goods and services 
amounted to USD 24.1 billion in 2005 – 
11.8 per cent up on 2004. Exports of 
goods and services were worth USD 10.9 
billion (down 3.2 per cent) and imports 
USD 13.2 billion (up 28.4 per cent), giv-
ing a trade deficit of USD 2.2 billion 
instead of a surplus of USD 1.1 billion in 
2004.  
A positive feature is that the EU, since 
enlargement, has become Ukraine’s larg-
est export market, accounting for 33.6 
per cent of its total trade in goods and 
services. But the development in mutual 
trade has taken place on an old struc-
tural basis more characteristic of trade 
between developed and developing coun-
tries (Table 10). 
Ukraine specializes in exporting min-
eral products (above all energy sources), 
non-precious metals and products thereof 
(mainly ferrous metals recently, though 
aluminium and copper also featured 
prominently earlier). Imports are domi-
nated by various machinery and equip-
ment. There is a tendency towards intra-
trade in the textile and clothing and the 
chemicals and associated industries. 
EU direct investment in Ukraine’s 
economy increased by a factor of 53 
between 1995 and 2006 (Figure 7). After 
the enlargement and start of the ENP, 
the European Union strengthened its role 
as leading investor, so that it now ac-
counts for 71.7 per cent of the FDI to-
tal. This is a remarkable increase since 
2004, when the proportion for the EU 
15 was 35.3 per cent and for the EU 25 
56 per cent. However, the upsurge was 
largely caused by two major investments: 
acquisition of 93.02 per cent of the 
shares of Kryvorizhstal (UAH 24.2 billion 
or USD 4.8 billion) by Mittal Steel Ger-
many GmbH, and of a 93.5 per cent 
tranche (USD 1028 billion) of Aval Bank 
shares by the Austrian Raiffeisen Interna-
tional Bank-Holding AG. 
At the same time, EU countries such 
as Greece and Ireland decreased their 
FDI to Ukraine, while there was a slow 
investment increase from Italy, Spain, 
Slovenia, Finland and the Czech Republic. 
The development of EU–Ukrainian eco-
nomic relations after adoption of the 
ENP is partly explained by further trade 
liberalization. It mostly relates to trade in 
steel products under an agreement 
signed on July 27, 2005 for the period 
of 2005–6, raising Ukraine’s quota from 
730,000 to 980,000 t in 2005 and to 
1,004,500 t in 2006. After accession to 
the WTO, steel exports to the EU will be 
fully liberalized. 
Table 10
Main features of the goods-trade structure between Ukraine and the EU, 
1996, 2000 and 2005, % 
 
 Exports to EU Imports from EU 
V. Mineral products 29.5 20.1 27.8 6.6 9.3 2.0 
VI. Products of chemical and associated industries 14.5 10.7 7.0 13.3 13.3 15.1 
XI. Textile and textile products 8.2 10.1 7.9 5.7 9.0 5.9 
XV. Non-precious metals and products thereof 15.8 28.9 28.8 6.9 7.6 6.2 
 incl. ferrous metals and products thereof 8.8 17.6 25.1 2.9 4.5 3.5 
XVI. Mechanical equipment; machinery and equipment, 
electrical equipment and parts thereof; devices for sound 
and video recording and reproduction, etc. 
3.9 9.6 6.0 24.0 25.2 29.9 
XVII. Means of transport; transport equipment, units and 
accessories  2.9 1.5 2.1 4.8 4.9 11.0 
Source: Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. 
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Since January 1, 2005, the require-
ments for export and import licensing 
for all textile and clothing supplies, in-
cluding the double checking system, have 
been repealed, even though Ukraine had 
not acquired WTO membership by that 
date. In June 2005 Ukraine introduced 
changes in its customs tariff schedule to 
levels agreed in the agreement on textile 
products with the European Communities. 
Exclusion of Ukraine from the list of 
transition economies, which took place in 
December 2005, was an extremely im-
portant event for development of mutual 
economic relations, enabling Ukrainian 
exporters to acquire more favourable 
treatment within EU anti-dumping proce-
dures.  
Further liberalization steps may be as-
sociated with adoption of an extended 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
between the EU and Ukraine, to take 
over from the current Cooperation and 
Partnership Agreement in 2008. A major 
element could be transition to a free 
trade area, with talks starting after 
Ukraine’s WTO accession.  
The most important line of develop-
ment of the EU–Ukrainian economic rela-
tions at present is implementation of the 
ENP Action Plan. For instance, a number 
of agreements have been signed since 
2005: 
∗ on cooperation between Ukraine and 
the European Investment Bank, 
∗ on cooperation over the Global Navi-
gation Satellite System (GNSS), 
∗ on Ukraine’s participation in the 
European Galileo Programme for satel-
lite radio navigation, which is a first 
step to full extension to Ukraine of 
the European Geostationary Navigation 
Overlay Service, 
∗ on civil aviation, providing free access 
of European air carriers to the 
Ukrainian air transport market and 
leading to joining the EU common 
aviation area, 
∗ a memorandum on mutual under-
standing of cooperation in the energy 
sector, focusing on four key sectors: 
nuclear safety, integration of the elec-
tricity and gas markets, security of 
energy supplies and transit of carbo-
hydrates, and structural reform, 
higher standards, safety, and environ-
ment protection in coal mining, 
Figure 7
Growth of FDI from the EU and some EU member-states to Ukraine, 1995–2006 
(USD million) 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Total Austria Cyprus Germany Netherlands United
Kingdom
Hungary
01,01,1995
1,01,2000
01,01,2004 (EU-15)
01,01,2004 (EU-25)
1,012006
101,10,2006
11746,3 5505,5 5700,7
 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. 
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∗ on cooperation with the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) 
on peaceful use of nuclear energy; 
this incorporates financial participation 
in the construction of a new shield at 
Chernobyl, and modernization of nu-
clear reactors at Khmelnitsky and 
Rivne. 
There has been some progress in co-
operation in science and technology, 
based on an agreement of July 4, 2002, 
focusing on issues of environment, cli-
mate, and surface; biomedical and health 
care research; agriculture, forestry and 
fishing; industrial and production tech-
nologies, materials science and metrology; 
non-nuclear power engineering; trans-
port; information society technologies; 
social science; science and technology 
policy; education and exchange of re-
search personnel. Ukraine is participating 
in 43 research projects under the EU’s 
Sixth Framework Programme.12 
With the view to facilitating the entry 
of Ukrainian industrial products onto the 
EU market, the two sides agreed in De-
cember 2005 to measures aimed at 
Ukraine’s accession the Agreement on 
Conformity Assessment and Acceptance 
of Industrial Products (ACAA) by 2011. 
An action plan was adopted and the EU 
expressed readiness to extend technical 
assistance under the Tacis and the TAIEX 
programmes. 
In trans-border cooperation, the core 
developments are associated with four 
functioning Euro-regions that include EU 
members or acceding countries: “The 
Buh” (Ukraine–Poland–Belarus), “The 
Carpathian” (Ukraine–Hungary–Poland– 
Romania–Slovak Republic), and “The 
Lower Danube” and “The Upper Prut” 
(both Ukraine–Moldova–Romania). The 
new approach in this field is associated 
with the introduction of neighbourhood 
programmes: “Poland–Belarus–Ukraine”, 
                                                   
12 The National Information Centre for Ukraine–
EU S&T Cooperation. Statistical Data on Participa-
tion of Ukrainian scientists in the EU’s Sixth 
Framework Programme, Bulletin No. 32–3, April–
May 2006. 
“Romania–Ukraine”, and “Hungary–
Slovak Republic–Ukraine”. Here concepts 
for common development of frontier ter-
ritories of Ukraine, Hungary, and Roma-
nia (INTERREGIO), and between Ukraine 
and Hungary have been adopted. 
According to the ENP Action Plan, 
Ukraine will develop annual implementa-
tion plans that specify terms, responsible 
agencies, and sources of technical assis-
tance (if referred to certain positions of 
a plan). The principle directions of these 
implementation measures embrace: 
∗ Liberalization measures for trade, es-
pecially in line with WTO accession 
procedures. 
∗ Harmonizing the tax system with EU 
principles, including suspension of sev-
eral tax preferences that distort com-
petition, i.e. aspects of VAT13 and ex-
cise duties,14 and administration of 
taxes and customs duties; a govern-
ment concept for financial control and 
audit; adoption by Parliament of a 
law on securities and stock exchange. 
∗ Finalizing the process of joining the 
main international agreements for in-
tellectual property protection, though 
enforcement remains below required 
standards. 
∗ Modernizing the technical-regulation 
system and consumer protection to 
conform with WTO requirements and 
relevant European regulations, while 
simplifying certification procedures re-
lating to compatibility assessment with 
regard to national standards.15 
                                                   
13 E.g. with tolling schemes, temporary imports, 
operative leasing, etc. 
14 Primarily on alcohol. 
15 In May 2006, Ukraine introduced 3147 na-
tional standards harmonized with international 
and European standards, of total of 16,765 stan-
dards valid in March 2006 (State Committee on 
Technical Regulation and Consumer Policy (2006). 
Green Book on the Policy of Adaptation of Na-
tional Legislation in the Sphere of Technical 
Regulation and Consumer Policy to European 
Requirements, Kiev, p. 31). However, over 60 
commodity items posing no significant risk to 
consumers were excluded from the list for com-
pulsory certification. 
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∗ Strengthening competition policy and 
streamlining regulatory mechanisms 
through enhanced protection of com-
petition; laws on quality and safety of 
food products; bringing state support 
for automobile production into con-
formity with WTO norms; government 
procurement, etc. 
But there are negative as well as posi-
tive sides to ENP implementation: failure 
to adopt some legislation, e.g. a new 
version of the company act, to ensure 
civilized relations among Ukrainian joint-
stock companies,16 or an act on general 
responsibility for product safety; there 
have been frequent postponements in the 
implementation process, over adoption of 
new acts and amendment of current leg-
islation, for instance, over measures to 
promote the adoption of ISO 9000 or 
ISO 14000 standards, or Hazard Analy-
sis and Critical Control Point (HACCP). 
From 2007, the EU will alter its ex-
ternal support instruments to bring co-
operation onto a new level. This includes 
new instruments such as the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instru-
ment, technical assistance instruments 
AENEAS and TAIEX, and new project im-
plementation mechanisms (Twinning). 
Ukraine will concentrate its efforts on 
adopting key elements of the acquis in 
the sectors of environment, competition 
and energy, including renewable energy 
sources, with a view to joining the En-
ergy Community Treaty. Progress will 
mean forming open electricity and gas 
markets in Ukraine, with growing inte-
gration with relevant EU markets. 
Ukraine is seeking to assert itself as a 
key East–West transporting agent for oil, 
especially through the Euro-Asian Oil 
Transport Corridor, of which the 
Odessa–Brody pipeline is an integral 
part. However, these plans require ade-
quate financing, for which a form of 
                                                   
16 One major reason for poor portfolio invest-
ment in Ukraine has been disputes over violation 
of the rights of shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders. 
international consortium is seen as a 
suitable solution. Ukraine is also engaged 
on the INOGATE programme to reform 
Ukraine’s gas transportation system.  
The prospects of cooperation will 
largely depend on the specific content of 
the new Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, to be negotiated from 2007. 
 
 
* * * * * 
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ALTERNATIVES TO FULL EU MEMBERSHIP 
Sándor Meisel 
Not for the first time in its history, the 
European Union has to face pressure 
from some countries for accession. The 
EU has also had to handle several times 
before the problem of reorganizing rela-
tions with neighbouring countries, to fit 
the relationship better to the EU proc-
esses of deepening and widening.  
Based on the events of the past, it 
can be concluded that the EU Union 
usually makes alternative proposals for 
full-fledged membership or proposals for 
bringing such countries into a close-to-
membership position. Some of these insti-
tutional constructions have been worka-
ble, such as the European Economic 
Area. Another example of an alternative 
to membership might be the first-
generation association agreements 
reached with four Mediterranean Euro-
pean countries in the 1960s and 1970s. 
THE THEORETICAL            
FRAMEWORK 
The legal and institutional frames for an 
alternative to membership exclude the 
two extreme cases of fully fledged mem-
bership and of nothing being offered. 
Every enlargement in the history of 
the European Communities and European 
Union has meant full membership for the 
acceding countries. That does not mean 
each new member-state could participate 
fully in all common policies and commu-
nity mechanisms from its date of entry, 
for all accessions prescribed some tem-
porary arrangements. But those ar-
rangements never curbed the new mem-
ber-state’s involvement in the common 
institutions or in decision-making. 
Starting mainly in the early 1990s, 
there could be seen a process of seg-
mentation in the Community. Certain 
countries would not participate in certain 
fields of integration, not on a temporary 
basis, but without any final date for the 
opting out being set. Segmentation takes 
place in the intergovernmental pillars of 
the Union (e.g. the second pillar) and in 
the community pillar, at least some ele-
ments of it (e.g. the EMU, or some of 
the Schengen). It is important to state 
that opting out has been reserved exclu-
sively for original member-states, not ac-
ceding countries, where such arrange-
ments are disallowed by the accession 
criteria, and all elements of the acquis 
have to be accepted. 
It is not clear whether this will re-
main so in the future. Theoretically it is 
not possible to preclude the possibility of 
a type of membership that does not 
guarantee full participation in all fields 
of integration, excluding new members 
from certain elements and mechanisms of 
integration indefinitely, as a sort of lim-
ited or second-class membership. There 
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are some views on what areas such limi-
tations on new members might apply, 
such as policies involving financial redis-
tributions, e.g. structural funds, agricul-
tural subsidies and budgetary issues. This 
might also relate to certain elements of 
the four freedoms. The extent of limita-
tion of membership would be the result 
of a workable compromise between the 
original members and the new member. 
It would be a very delicate question to 
find the point where limited membership 
remained attractive and acceptable for 
the acceding country, and where the 
balance of limited rights and advantages 
of being a member could be established, 
if such point exists at all. 
Institutionalizing limited membership of 
the EU has serious risks to do with fur-
ther segmentation of integration, which 
might lead beyond second-class member-
ship to third or fourth-class membership, 
etc. That would devalue membership it-
self, even for some existing member-
states. 
Another theoretically possible alterna-
tive to membership would keep a coun-
try within the framework of EU external 
relations, probably as an associated 
partner, but with substantially enriched 
content of association. 
POSSIBLE ELEMENTS 
Where the EU elaborated an enriched 
relationship without formal membership, 
as a substitute for the latter, there 
would need to be substantial advantages 
for such countries, to offset against their 
adjustment costs. This might make it 
“more expensive” for the EU than exist-
ing association agreements, but undoubt-
edly less problematic than limited mem-
bership. 
The EU has a longstanding experience 
with association agreements with coun-
tries seeking closer relations. The main 
elements have been trade concessions 
coupled with financial assistance, but 
these would be insufficient for an en-
riched relationship that was to form an 
alternative to formal membership. In 
Hungary’s experience, the concessions in 
the Europe Agreement were insufficient 
in some cases, as they did not cover the 
desired trade structure or the benefits of 
liberalization remained hypothetical. The 
EU needs to be less rigid in according 
trade concessions and to tailor them to 
the needs of individual countries con-
cerned. The Union was always very cau-
tious about concessions on access to ag-
ricultural markets, as the provisions of 
the various association agreements show. 
The trade provisions of an enriched and 
upgraded association would involve much 
greater liberalization, especially in agri-
culture, which is of crucial interest to 
the countries in question. 
One element usually regarded as 
among the most attractive aspects of 
membership is participation in the Single 
European Market. This needs to be con-
sidered when devising an alternative to 
formal membership. Such complete mar-
ket integration has proved to be a suc-
cess in the European Economic Area. But 
it does not mean that automatic, rigid 
extension of single-market rules to 
neighbouring countries would be efficient 
and meaningful without the prospect of 
eventual accession. The provisions are a 
logical part of the EU offer, but need to 
be formulated less rigidly and differenti-
ated according to the capacities of the 
countries concerned. Furthermore, situa-
tions of environmental, social and other 
dumping must be scrupulously avoided. 
One oft-cited shortcoming of non-
membership is lack of free movement of 
persons and labour. All neighbouring 
countries seek the ways to improve this 
problem, which has to be addressed 
somehow in enriched association, sensitive 
though the issue is and unrealistic 
though it would be to attempt a full 
resolution of it. But upgraded association 
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might realistically include small, cautious 
improvement with precise timetables and 
assistance and closer cooperation ac-
corded to border control authorities in 
the countries in question. 
The other very sensitive question is fi-
nancing and financial assistance. 
Participation in the common mechanisms 
is a natural and understandable privilege 
of a member-state. The Community fi-
nancial system can be extended to non-
members only with substantial limitations. 
Here the EU needs to clarify its priori-
ties. It should pay attention to the ad-
ministrative capacities of the beneficiary 
countries, and if possible simplify the 
transfer mechanisms. But this should not 
damage the EU system or efforts to 
combat illegal use of money and corrup-
tion. Turning to institutional relations be-
tween the EU and countries with en-
riched association, the traditional schemes 
of existing bilateral association agree-
ments again seem insufficient. Although 
involvement and full participation in 
common institutions and decision are a 
member-state privilege, closer institutional 
cooperation still needs to be elaborated, 
covering regular exchange of informa-
tion, efficient dialogue, and consultations. 
Further crucial elements of an en-
riched relationship would be control of 
the functioning of democratic institutions, 
respect for human rights and the rights 
of minorities, and the rule of law. This 
contributes to creating an area of stabil-
ity in the EU neighbourhood, which is of 
vital interest to all the parties to the as-
sociation. The EU should formulate gen-
eral terms and be precise and more 
concrete in its expectations. Progress 
made by countries concerned might be 
rewarded by extending economic conces-
sions and improving certain conditions of 
enriched association. 
Enriched and upgraded cooperation 
with countries included in this type of 
non-member association should reflect the 
clear and unambiguous position of the 
EU and its member-states. As the experi-
ence of neighbourhood policy shows, in-
dividual actions by certain member-states, 
based on partial interest, would be 
counterproductive. Speaking with one 
voice and eschewing double standards 
are necessary elements in cooperation 
offered as an alternative to membership. 
 
* * * * * 
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INTEGRATION PROSPECTS FOR UKRAINE: SES 
AND/OR „DEEP FREE TRADE” WITH THE EU? 
Zsuzsa Ludvig 
Ukraine has faced an “orientation di-
lemma” in recent years. What foreign 
and foreign-economic policy should be 
followed by a country located between 
an enlarged European Union and Russia, 
with close economic and political links 
with both? The issue will remain of key 
importance. According to widespread 
views in official circles in the EU and in 
Russia, Ukraine has to choose between 
the two partners – there is strategic in-
compatibility between the two directions 
of orientation. Yet this either/or ap-
proach cannot be accepted or followed 
by Ukraine, with its tight though very 
different ties towards both partners. 
In a narrow, rather economic aspect, 
either/or means choosing between inte-
gration goals with the EU and participa-
tion in the Russian-initiated Single Eco-
nomic Space (SES). The problem is that 
Ukraine has already made commitments 
in both directions. Negotiations on “deep 
free trade” between Ukraine and the EU 
have begun under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), while 
Ukraine signed the agreement on creat-
ing an SES with Russia, Belarus and Ka-
zakhstan in 2003, aimed at establishing 
a real integration zone within the CIS, 
starting from free trade and ending with 
economic union. However, since economic 
relations in both directions are highly 
important, it would be optimal for 
Ukraine to develop both integration 
processes in parallel, in ways that are 
not contradictory with each other.  
THE EITHER/OR APPROACH 
AND POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS 
What answers do affected partners give 
on political level to the basic issue of 
integration in two directions? There have 
been significant changes in the official 
answers over the past few years, al-
though the underlying content has not 
changed much, except in Russia’s case. 
On the EU side, a commission on 
“Communication on Relations with Rus-
sia” in February 2004 was sceptical 
about the concept of the SES, bearing in 
mind EU ideas on a common economic 
space with Russia and planned free 
trade with both Ukraine and Russia after 
their WTO accessions. However, the re-
port failed to give specific reasons for 
this scepticism. One reason may have 
been the EU intention to develop deeper 
ties with Ukraine, which according to EU 
logic conflicts with a Ukrainian integra-
tion process with Russia. A second ar-
gument could be the way the SES con-
cept involves CIS countries to which 
Brussels has yet to offer a free-trade 
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option (Belarus and Kazakhstan). Later, 
EU scepticism was strengthened by wors-
ening bilateral relations with an increas-
ingly ambitious and forthright Russia, 
leading to conflicts in their shared vicin-
ity, including Ukraine itself. Present EU 
positions on parallel integration remain 
unclear and detailed analysis of specific 
questions is still lacking.  
The biggest change has been in the 
official Russian approach. In 2003, com-
plementarity between Russian and EU 
plans seemed acceptable: Moscow and 
Brussels had agreed on the idea of a 
legally harmonized “common economic 
space” between them. The idea of SES 
already existed at the time: the Russians 
were thinking of a pan-European com-
mon economic space to include several 
CIS countries. Later, the process of legal 
harmonization with the EU came to be 
questioned in Moscow. Signs of an ei-
ther/or approach have become increas-
ingly apparent recently as EU-Russian 
relations worsen and indefinite Ukrain-
ian-Russian links appear in the back-
ground. Russia is not officially against 
Ukrainian aims of European integration, 
including establishment of a deep free-
trade zone, but in practice it tries to 
pressurize Ukraine by every means, in-
cluding playing the “energy card”. Rus-
sian behaviour can be explained by eco-
nomic fears that Ukrainian reluctance 
over the SES initiative (due to EU scepti-
cism and to internal political disputes) 
may obstruct deeper integration stages 
within the SES that constitute the essence 
of the initiative. There are also general 
fears in Russia that Ukraine’s example 
may have fragmenting impacts on the 
CIS. 
The Ukrainian approach is least defi-
nite of all, due to the divisions in the 
political elite and society. Official views 
expressed by Ukrainian leaders on the 
intention and depth of Ukrainian SES 
participation differ and fluctuate over 
time. On the one hand, the European 
choice for Ukraine remains a priority, at 
least in official rhetoric. On the other, a 
minimum of SES concept-free trade with-
out restrictions is acceptable to most ma-
jor political forces. The problem is that 
“free trade only” suits the interests of 
Ukraine, but remains unpalatable to 
Moscow. 
THE ECONOMIC IRRATIONAL-
ITY OF THE EITHER/OR AP-
PROACH 
There is a duality in Ukrainian foreign 
economic relations. The EU and CIS 
spaces are both crucially important, but 
for different reasons. Ukrainian export 
volumes to the other three SES partners 
(Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) repre-
sent almost as big a market as the EU 
25 (Table 11). Much the same applies to 
Ukrainian imports, though fuel imports 
from Russia and other CIS countries 
make the post-Soviet share slightly 
higher. 
Table 11 
Ukraine’s major trade partners in 2005 
(%) 
 
Exports Imports 
Russia 21.9 Russia 35.5 
SES 26.4 SES 40.0 
CIS 31.3 CIS 47.1 
EU 25 26.9 EU 25 32.8 
Turkey 5.9 China 5.0 
USA 2.8 USA 2.0 
China 2.1 China 1.7 
Source: www.ukrstat.gov.ua. 
 
But deeper analysis of structural fea-
tures indicates important differences be-
tween the market significance of the CIS 
and the EU spaces. Iron, steel and 
chemical products are almost equally im-
portant in both, owing to the special 
significance of these industries to the 
Ukrainian economy. But while total 
Ukrainian exports to the EU, including 
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other important product groups, repre-
sent very low added value, the structure 
of Ukrainian supplies to the Russian 
market is more favourable, with a 30 
per cent share of machinery or a 16 per 
cent share of agricultural and food 
products (Table 12). 
Table 12 
The structure of Ukrainian exports to the 
EU 25 and to Russia 
(%) 
 
Product group To EU 25, 2005 
To Russia, 
2004 
Live animals 0.2 8.0 
Food products 1.5 8.3 
Mineral products 24.5 3.1 
Chemical products 7.1 7.8 
Textile products 6.1 0.9 
Iron and steel 32.7 27.1 
Machines 5.2 18.0 
Vehicles 2.3 12.4 
Above mentioned 
together 79.3 85.6 
Sources: Eurostat, Gostamkom. 
 
Furthermore, both Russia and the EU 
are important sources of FDI for 
Ukraine. Although official Ukrainian sta-
tistics show strong asymmetry towards 
the EU, the presence of Russian capital 
in the Ukrainian economy is also vitally 
important if all the special, hidden flows 
of Russian capital are considered, such 
as arrival through tax havens or under 
Ukrainian cover (Table 13). 
Table 13 
Shares of Ukraine’s major investor countries 
in FDI stock, July 1, 2006 
(%) 
 
EU 25 67.2 
Russia 4.9 
(Cyprus) 11.1 
(Virgin Islands) 4.2 
United States 7.2 
Above mentioned together 94.6 
Source: www.ukrstat.gov.ua. 
 
The significance of Russian capital is 
also underlined by structural features. 
For example, the Russian shares in tele-
communications, non-ferrous metallurgy 
and oil refining exceed 50 per cent, by 
Russian calculations. Russian firms con-
trol four out of the six big Ukrainian oil 
refineries. More importantly for the fu-
ture is the strong intention on the part 
of Russian business and political circles 
to expand further in the Ukrainian 
economy.  
 THE SUPERFLUITY OF THE    
EITHER/OR APPROACH 
Expert opinion on all three sides empha-
sizes the dual character of the Ukrainian 
economy, which makes a choice between 
the two main partners impossible.17 
(Naturally, opposite opinions can also be 
found, especially within the EU.) These 
professional arguments against either/or 
perceptions understand the key impor-
tance of the issue and see it from a 
practical, economic point of view, while 
seeking a solution acceptable to all three 
sides. Could the solution be a pan-
European area? 
In principle, the EU offers a possible 
compromise, since it has built up parallel 
dialogues with Ukraine and with Russia, 
with very similar content, but different 
institutional forms: an ENP with Ukraine, 
and four common spaces with Russia. 
The formula of “deep free trade” or 
“free trade plus” emerged in the spring 
of 2006 in the ENP/Ukraine approach. 
The formula for “free trade plus” with 
                                                   
17 See, for example, works from Ukraine by Va-
lery Heyets and Volodymyr Sidenko of the Insti-
tute for Economy and Forecasting of the National 
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and by Natalia 
Kukharskaya of Odessa, from Russia from the 
Centre for Integration Problems of the Institute 
of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sci-
ences, and from the Vienna Institute for Interna-
tional Economic Studies, as well as the important 
study “The Prospects of Deep Free Trade be-
tween the European Union and Ukraine,” coordi-
nated by the Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels. 
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Russia also appeared during preparation 
for a new “strategic agreement” between 
Russia and the EU, to be concluded for 
the period after expiry of the recent 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
The concepts of ENP-Ukraine and the 
common spaces between the EU and 
Russia have several features in common: 
∗ Free trade (“free trade plus”), follow-
ing WTO membership with a legal 
harmonization process. 
∗ The idea of “four freedoms”. 
∗ Specific economic sides to energy dia-
logue (including ideas of linking 
power systems and perhaps gas and 
oil markets, joining the EU Galileo sys-
tem, etc.) 
∗ Intensive political dialogue (with coop-
eration on justice and home affairs, 
and in foreign policy issues). 
Since the birth of the basic idea in a 
CEPS study entitled “The Prospects of 
Deep Free Trade between the European 
Union and Ukraine” in the spring of 
2006, the features of “free trade plus” 
have been elaborated further by studying 
sectoral impacts. For Russia, the concept 
still needs developing and applying.  
POTENTIAL CLASHES BETWEEN 
EU IDEAS AND THE RUSSIAN 
(SES) CONCEPT 
In principle, the Russian initiative for a 
deep integration form within the CIS 
space, with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine taking part, does not neces-
sarily clash with the idea of free trade 
between Ukraine (and Russia) and the 
EU, as its aims are very similar: the 
“four freedoms”, including free trade, 
accompanied by a harmonization process. 
However, major questions emerge. How 
will the harmonization in the SES take 
place – in a way complementary to EU 
ideas or in a competitive way? Will the 
two processes match or clash? Will the 
SES be another paper institution in the 
CIS space, or a living one based on 
strict common rules? Though Russian 
intentions incline towards the latter, ex-
isting experiments on CIS frameworks 
suggest the opposite. 
There are also important consequences 
for the SES in the specific conditions of 
the future WTO accessions of Ukraine 
and Russia. Common positions agreed by 
Russia and Ukraine might pave the way 
for the SES, but in practice, positions 
that were negotiated separately have 
narrowed the scope for deeper integra-
tion within the SES or call for its post-
ponement. (For example, the creation of 
a customs union between the two coun-
tries is hampered by different customs 
tariffs with third countries negotiated 
during the WTO accession processes.) 
CONCLUSIONS 
Theoretically, the EU ideas for creating 
“free trade plus” with Russia and with 
Ukraine could be applied alongside the 
SES concept, but there are several risks 
in the implementation on all sides, mainly 
of political character. There are serious 
uncertainties in Ukraine’s political direc-
tion, due to constant struggles between 
rival political forces. The Russian ap-
proach to the EU also raises serious 
questions. The content of the negotiations 
on the new strategic agreement with the 
EU is still unclear. Will Russia be ready 
to compromise or present a very self-
respecting face? What kind of Russia 
will there be after Putin? Finally, the EU 
side is not unified either. In fact, it is 
very divided, with no “one voice” on the 
Russian or Ukrainian issue, least of all 
on the EU–Russia–Ukraine triangle. 
* * * * * 
